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One of the most significant areas of debate within the 
Platonic dialogues has been Plato's conception of rhetoric. 
This area of interpretation has been so vast and varied that 
it is hard to believe that everyone has been analyzing the 
same dialogues. However, one view has predominated, and that 
is the view that Plato, as seen primarily in the Gorgias and 
the Phaedrus, disapproved of rhetoric and writing and has 
historically been its fiercest opponent. 
In fact, Edward Corbett blames Plato for "all the 
derogatory things that men have said about this art [rhetoric] 
down through the ages" and further says that the negative 
views of rhetoric "have their roots in Plato's strictures" 
(538). Corbett is supported in his claim by Sir Karl Popper 
who adds: 
Finally, in forming our judgements on Plato's 
procedure we must not forget that Plato likes to 
argue against rhetoric and sophistry; and indeed 
that he is the man who by his attacks on the 
'Sophists' created the bad associations connected 
with that word (quoted in Vickers 83). 
In fact, Popper continues to say that Plato should be 
censored; a view held by many of Plato's critics. 
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The most often cited crimes Plato has committed to 
deserve his banishing and to be considered a "lifelong enemy 
of rhetoric" are as follows: 
1. In the act of depreciating rhetoric, Plato shows 
himself to be a masterful rhetorician (Corbett 
538). 
2. Plato's view of rhetoric assumes that "knowledge 
of the truth as a precondition of legitimate-or 
'real' rhetoric is entirely unreasonable" 
(Conley 14). 
3. "He upheld the validity of absolutism, thereby 
scorning the legitimacy of probability and its 
counterpart, opinion" (Golden 17). 
4. Plato attacked the art of rhetoric because it 
represented what he most disliked in Athenian 
life (Hunt 69). 
Of course, not all of these claims are without support. 
However, if these claims are, indeed, accurate portrayals of 
Plato's doctrine concerning rhetoric and writing, then why is 
Plato still considered a strong force in rhetoric and 
compositions studies? What makes Plato redeemable from his 
flawed perceptions of rhetoric and writing? Hopefully, 
through the course of this thesis, Plato's redeemable 
--------------------------------------
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qualities will become clear, and the wrongheadedness of these 
charges against him will make themselves known. I am not 
entirely convinced that Plato has the right answers on all 
questions; I do reject his notion of Ideal Forms and the 
Doctrine of Recollection. But I am convinced that he has been 
unfairly charged in the areas of rhetoric and writing, and 
that there is significant value in his notion of dialectic 
(active learning) as a means for using language in the pursuit 
of knowledge. 
Since these charges against Plato stem from his texts, 
the best place to start is in one. The Phaedrus and the 
Gorgias are the two dialogues most cited for their claims 
·against rhetoric, and I would like to focus on the Phaedrus 
for the duration of this essay. I have chosen not to discuss 
the Gorgias because it discusses sophistic rhetoric only. As 
a result, the picture of rhetoric, sophistic rhetoric, is 
entirely negative. The Phaedrus, as I will show, discusses 
not only sophistic rhetoric, which Plato despises, but it also 
offers his conception of True rhetoric or dialectical 
rhetoric. As Edwin Black says, "Fortunately, we still have the 
dialogues, their durability so manifestly established that 
they could not be hurt by one more fresh look" (361). The 
following chapter will be an active, engaged investigation of 
the Phaedrus and an attempt at addressing Plato's concerns 
about rhetoric and writing. 
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I am providing my discussion in an order that is not 
typical for this kind of document. Normally, a literature 
review would precede a discussion of the paper topic. 
However, for my purposes, it is more important that I provide 
my own close reading of the Phaedrus first and then address 
the criticisms and provide a literature review. This allows 
me to illustrate first what I have found to be important in 
the Phaedrus; this interpretation will then guide how I 
address the critics. 
I have identified four threads running through the 
Platonic texts that are so inextricably bound with Plato's 
conception of rhetoric that they must be discussed. These 
threads are: 
1. Rhetoric and persuasion 
2. Rhetoric and knowledge 
3. Rhetoric and dialectic 
4. Rhetoric and context 
So, not only will I be illuminating what I perceive to be 
Plato's notions of rhetoric and writing, but I will also 
explore how these notions are bound to persuasion, knowledge, 
dialectic, and context. What follows then is a brief 
discussion of some of the criticisms leveled at the 
literariness of the Phaedrus followed by a discussion of 
persuasion, knowledge, dialectic, and context in relation to 
Plato's rhetoric. In the chapters to follow, I will address 
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the four charges with which I began this discussion as well as 
directly confront three major critics: Jacques Derrida, Brian 
Vickers, and Jasper Neel. In chapter three, I will apply the 
Platonic concepts discussed here to issues of pedagogy in 
general and writing instruction in particular. 
Rhetoric and Persuasion/Morality 
Of all his dialogues, Plato's Phaedrus is the one which 
deals most fully with the subject of rhetoric. In it, "Plato 
expresses his criticisms of both contemporary and earlier 
schools of rhetoric, and he offers both theoretical and 
practical suggestions to improve rhetoric" (Curran 66). 
However, the critics of Plato view this dialogue as a poorly 
constructed attack on rhetoric and writing. And, the Phaedrus 
has received a great deal of criticism related to its unity. 
The Phaedrus has traditionally been viewed as being 
divided into two distinct parts: the first where Lysias's 
speech and Socrates's two speeches are given is associated 
primarily with love, and the second, more conversational, with 
rhetoric. If these two parts were unrelated, the Phaedrus 
would be aptly criticized. However, as current scholars note, 
the two sections are both focused on rhetoric. " ... Plato's 
purposes are not independent of one another because he was, 
after all, not writing a treatise but a dramatic argument" 
(Stewart 117). 
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Further, G.J DeVries states, "In the Phaedrus the central 
theme is the persuasive use of words. The aim of the dialogue 
is to show its foundation. Its means is beauty, its condition 
(unlike current rhetoric's) is knowledge. Eros is the 
striving after knowledge and after beauty. So the main 
subthemes of the dialogue are intertwined" (23). Therefore, 
the attack on the unity of the Phaedrus may simply be a result 
of a misreading or a one-sided reading. There are obvious 
connections between the two sections of the Phaedrus; the 
intertwining of example and practice, the passion related to 
love and the emotive elements of rhetoric. This intertwining 
in the Phaedrus also illustrates another Platonic concept: 
the relationship between persuasion and moral responsibility. 
Plato makes a definite connection between the persuasive 
nature of language and the moral consequences of language. 
Thus, to Plato, the very act of communicating through language 
entails a moral responsibility. This moral responsibility is 
what separates Plato's rhetoric from the rhetoric of the 
sophists. 
The difference between Sophistic rhetoric (false 
rhetoric) and Platonic rhetoric (true rhetoric) is explained 




I do not know what effect my accusers have had on 
you gentlemen, but for my own part, I was almost 
carried away by them--their arguments were so 
convincing. On the other hand, scarcely a word of 
what they said was true. I was especially 
astonished at one of their many misrepresentations; 
I mean when they told you that you must be careful 
not to let me deceive you--the implication being 
that I am a skillful speaker. I thought that it was 
particularly brazen of them to tell you this without 
a blush, since they must know that they will soon be 
effectively confuted, when it becomes obvious that I 
have not the slightest skill as a speaker--unless, 
of course, by a skillful speaker they mean one who 
speaks the truth. If that is what they mean, I 
would agree with them that I am an orator, though 
not after their pattern (Apology 176). 
Plato's point here is that the discourse of the Sophists 
is very convincing but untrue. "The Sophists argue in favor 
of a case--through their discourse realities are created in 
the minds of their auditors ..• without regard for ultimate 
truth or falsity" (Hikins 161). This type of rhetoric--use of 
language to manipulate--is immoral. Platonic rhetoric, on the 
other hand, "argues in the service of Truth--realities are not 
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constructed through discourse, Reality is discovered by an 
audience or elicited by a speaker through discourse" (Hikins 
161). So, by viewing the use of language as an act of moral 
responsibility towards the audience, Plato inserts a moral 
quality into his definition of True rhetoric. 
In the Phaedrus Plato uses the allegory of love as a 
framework on which to build a discussion of discourse. By 
doing so, Plato allows himself to discuss and illustrate the 
emotive (rhetorical) nature of language and its relationship 
to moral responsibility: the right and wrong ways to use 
discourse/persuasion. This allegory conveys Plato's ideas 
about the morality of human discourse: 
First is the nonlover. In his acts of love, he 
corresponds to the rhetorician or antirhetorician 
who would set as the most desirable goal for human 
discourse its theoretical and of course unattainable 
complete lack of suasiveness. We think, here, of 
the modern Gradgrinds who in effect say that language 
should give us facts and nothing but the facts 
(Again, an unattainable goal for language). The 
disinterested speakers (and here 'speaker' is a 
generic term covering any user of discourse, 
including writer) would, like the nonlover, exclude 
passion from his discourse and would make prudential 
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policy the desideratum of his utterances. That is 
this prudential user of language would 
conscientiously avoid the kind of discourse 
that ... goes beyond persuasion and transports the 
auditor ••. {Winterowd 11). 
This point is meaningful because of the complaints 
against Plato which imply that his use of myths and allegories 
and beautiful language in the Phaedrus show how he values 
rhetorical devices. Or that he used rhetoric to condemn 
rhetoric. Here we must again focus on his link between 
language and morality. I doubt very much that Plato would 
believe that language can be devoid of suasiveness, so why 
would he attack persuasion? It is the intent behind the 
language that is essential here. Is the speaker using 
persuasion simply to persuade or to teach? Or as I said 
above, is the speaker creating a reality for his audience or 
discovering one with them? 
If we were to believe that Plato rejected rhetoric, we 
would have to assume that Plato rejects "every emotive element 
in the realm of knowledge" {Grassi 28). This seems to lead 
to the current notion that language should only be 
"prudential" or poetic without any method of suasiveness. 
Here it might be interesting to think about the difference in 
methods between Plato and Aristotle. Academics praise 
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Aristotle for his rationality, clear explanation, and lack of 
passion: 
Again, if you string together a set of speeches 
expressive of character, and well finished in 
point of diction and thought, you will not produce 
the essential tragic effect nearly so well as with a 
play which, however deficient in these respects, 
yet has a plot and artistically constructed 
incidents (Aristotle Poetics 35). 
Plato knowingly approaches his subject imaginatively and with 
a greater degree of moral and artistic passion: 
But the region above the heaven was never worthily 
sung by the earthly poet, or will it ever be. It 
is, however, as I shall tell; for I must dare to 
speak the truth especially as truth is my theme. 
For the colourless, formless, and intangible truly 
existing essence, with which all true knowledge is 
concerned, holds this region and is visible only to 
the mind, the pilot of the soul (Phaedrus 247c3-7). 
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Plato's message is clear. "Moral discourse is not 
necessarily merely prudential discourse. The highest morality 
frequently demands the discourse of the true lover" (Winterowd 
14). Plato's rhetoric then, perhaps, focuses on language as 
an act, as well as a moral consequence. 
Knowledge and Rhetoric 
Before we go on and address the specific criticisms 
listed earlier regarding Plato, rhetoric, and writing (within 
the Phaedrus), we need to establish what his basic ideas of 
knowledge and learning are. I have stated previously that 
Plato's conception of rhetoric (with suasiveness as a central 
element) is inextricably bound to his notions of knowledge 
(with morality as an essential element), and this ideology 
drives the criticism of rhetoric and writing found in the 
Phaedrus. 
In order to understand Plato's ideas of knowledge and its 
relationship to rhetoric, it is most helpful to look at the 
Meno. The definition presented there is one of recollection. 
Learning is not the grasping of constantly invented ideas, but 
the recollecting of ideas you already have. Its important to 
note that Plato is not essentially concerned with final 
knowledge of the Idea, but, instead, he is concerned with the 
activity of pursuing knowledge; rhetoric as a process in that 
pursuit. In the Meno, Socrates reveals to us the inherent 
-----------------------------------··-- ·-------·-
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dangers of relying on the knowledge of others as "truth" 
instead of obtaining self-knowledge through a highly motivated 
effort to learn. In the Phaedrus, we see the same thing when 
Socrates finds Phaedrus with Lysias's speech; a speech he 
wishes to memorize because of Lysias's apparently great words. 
Because of this reliance on others for truth, Meno is held up 
to us as a man both ignorant of his self and of the issue of 
ignorance altogether. He has internalized a method of 
"thinking" and is unwilling to change. By consistently 
relying on the opinion of others and not critically 
questioning the validity of their opinions, he has lost his 
ability to know what he believes. It is this very ability to 
question that we see Socrates instilling in Phaedrus; Socrates 
saves Phaedrus from becoming like Meno. 
The Meno begins when Meno asks how virtue is acquired, 
whether by teaching, by practice, by nature, or by some other 
means. Socrates responds to Meno's question by calling it 
into question: 
SOC: I share the poverty of my fellow countrymen in 
this respect and confess to my shame that I 
have no knowledge about virtue at all. And 
how can I know a property of something when I 
do not even know what it is? Do you suppose 
that somebody entirely ignorant who Meno is 
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could say whether he is handsome and rich and 
wellborn or the reverse? Is that possible, do 
you think? 
MEN: No. But is this true about yourself, Socrates, 
that you don't even know what virtue is? 
SOC: Not only that, you may also say that, to the 
best of my belief, I have never yet met anyone 
who did know. 
MEN: What! Didn't you meet Gorgias when he was 
here? 
soc: Yes. 
MEN: And you still didn't think he knew? 
SOC: I'm a forgetful sort of person, and I can't say 
just now what I thought at the time .... So 
remind me, what it was, or tell me yourself if 
you will. No doubt you agree with him. 
MEN: Yes, I do (71b-d2). 
Meno's answer to Socrates's first question is an 
unqualified negative, a quick "no" to a complicated question. 
Both the quickness and absoluteness with which Meno answers 
serves to show how meager Meno's grasp of the question is. 
This answer illustrates how self-evident Meno thinks all 
questions are--none require analysis or thought. The whole 
dialogue illustrates that Meno doesn't know how to make a 
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distinction between what he knows and what he is persuaded to 
believe. 
Further along in the dialogue, we see Meno able to 
remember the words of others upon which his own opinions are 
formed. He remembers words representing meaning, but not the 
actual meaning itself. Here we encounter an important issue: 
Plato is criticized for having the belief that ideas exist 
separate and independent of words. However, this distinct.ion 
between ideas and words is illust.rative of his rhetorical 
ideals. Plato seems to believe that the ideas are more 
important than the words; however, as :r have discussed ahove, 
the use of the words is essential for the transfer of the 
ideas. This concept is illustrat.ed in the Soph_Lfit: 
STRA~GF~: Well. thinking and discourse are the 
same thing, except that what we call 
thinking is, precisely~ the inward 
dialogue carried on by the mind with 
itself without spoken sound. 
THEAT: Certainly. 
STRANGER: Whereas the stream which flows from 
the mind through the lips with sound 
is called discourse (263e). 
--------------------------------~ ---------~ 
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However, if the rhetor does not use the words in such a 
way as to excite and create an active mind, the listener will 
not get beyond the words. 
Obviously, if Plato is concerned solely with ideas, words 
become arbitrary signifiers to him. What is important is the 
idea; the language becomes subordinate~ One reason for this 
is the fact that the meaning of words is unfixed. 
SOC: When someone utters the word 'iron or 'silver' 
we all have the same object before our minds 
haven't we? 
PH: Certainly. 
SOC: But what about the words 'just' and 'good'? 
Don't we diverge, and dispute not only with 
one another but with our own selves? 
PH: Yes indeed. 
SOC: So in some cases we agree, and in others we 
don't. 
PH: Quite so. 
SOC: ... When [a student] comes across a particular 
word he must realize what it is, and be swift 
to perceive which of the two kinds the thing he 
proposes to discuss really belongs to (263-c4). 
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Socrates goes on to propose that a way to determine the 
meaning of these unfixed words is through an engaged 
discussion in order to arrive at a definition. This 
interrogation of the language enables language to become 
active. Therefore, a word becomes important only when it 
becomes "ensouled" with an idea--an active notion--an active 
occasion. So, when people like Meno or Phaedrus become only 
involved with the beauty of the language or become caught in 
the vagueness, they are passive. They become caught up in the 
persuasive nature of language without understanding or 
realizing what is being conveyed through the words. The 
language is working on them with no evolvement on their part; 
this is the danger Plato is concerned about with rhetoric and 
writing. This is why he makes the essential link between 
language and knowledge, language and activity, language and 
learning. 
So, Plato's rhetoric "serves to search for truths or 
probabilities yet to be discovered" (Hikins 171). Platonic 
rhetoric is a means for discovering knowledge through an 
active inquiry as opposed to transmitting opinion as was the 
practice of the sophists. And, this active method for the 
discovery of knowledge is the dialectic form embodied in the 
Platonic dialogues. 
17 
Dialectic and the Dialogue 
Reading a Platonic dialogue is not like reading a book or 
any other form of prose. The fact that it is a dialogue 
should be the first clue; a dialogue requires an active mind 
and an enormous amount of participation by the reader. In the 
course of the dialogues, Plato does not provide a doctrine or 
even a promise of rational discourse (as does Aristotle). 
What he does do, however, is prepare a way for thought and 
provide a forum through which something always gets 
accomplished. But, in order to even slightly grasp the 
"something" being done or become aware of what is being 
experienced, the reader must become one of the interlocutors 
of the dialogue. For if the reader does not take part and 
actively participate in the development of the conversation, a 
dialogue has not taken place. 
Plato's famous definition of rhetoric as "an art which 
leads the soul by means of words" mirrors "Gorgias's 
contention about the effect of the logos on the psyche, and 
Socrates admits in the Menexenus that the orators 'bewitch our 
souls'" (Connors 50). Another illustration of Plato's picture 
of the common response to oratory can be seen in the Phaedrus 
when Socrates responds to Phaedrus after the latter reads 
Lysias' speech. Socrates says the speech produced in him a 
"divine frenzy" (234d). 
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In order to avoid this bewitching of souls, Plato favors 
dialectic as the method of learning. And we can see how 
successful his dialectic is in the dialogues. Plato always 
sets up a strawman opposite to Socrates who, through the 
dialectic process, comes to realize his wrongheadedness, or 
how he has been allowing words to work on him. More often 
than not, the strawmen's biggest flaw is that they are relying 
on the words of others as truth (are bewitched by language) 
and not their own; they are ignorant of their own ignorance 
(Meno) and, as a result, fail to actively engage their souls 
and simply accept the opinions of others. This manipulation 
of words and souls is characteristically attributed to the 
sophists (Gorgias) and is fiercely condemned by Plato as a 
detrimental substitute for learning. 
So, one answer to the problem (danger) of the 
manipulation of the "rhetorical spell" (or the experts from 
rousing a crowd only to soothe "them down again with his 
spells" Phaedrus 267d) is to prevent it from happening on a 
basic level. Throughout the dialogues, Socrates tries very 
hard to control the form of the discourse. What he tries to 
do, again and again, is "subvert the rhetorical magic" by 
interrupting it with questions. As Eric Havelock says, 




But to say,"What do you mean? Say that 
again," abruptly disturbed the pleasurable 
complacency felt in the poetic formula or the image. 
It meant using different words and these equivalent 
words fail to be poetic; they would be prosaic. As 
the question was asked, and the alternative prosaic 
formula was attempted, the imaginations of 
speaker and teacher were offended, and the dream so 
to speak was disrupted, and some unpleasant effort 
of calculative reflection was substituted. In 
short, the dialectic ... was a weapon for arousing 
the consciousness from its dream language and 
stimulating it to think abstractly (quoted in 
Connors 52). 
Therefore, rhetoric, if misused, was interpreted by Plato to 
be technical manipulation of consciousness. This manipulation 
was exactly what Socrates accuses the sophists of in the 
Gorgias. But, by interrupting this trance-like flow of 
language, the one-way method of rhetoric was eliminated. Or 
sophistic rhetoric was replaced by Platonic rhetoric. 
We can see this interruptive method of question-and-
answer in the majority of Plato's dialogues, but especially in 
the Protagoras and the Gorgias. "A great deal of the struggle 
in the Protagoras ... is between Protagoras's desire to deliver 
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his opinions in long speeches and Socrates' obdurate refusal 
to allow him to do it" (Connors 52). In the Gorgias we see 
Socrates refusing any of his opponents the use of lengthy 
speeches: 
soc: Would you be willing, Gorgias, to continue 
our present method of conversing by question 
and answer, postponing to some other occasion 
lengthy discourses of the one begun by Polus? 
You must not, however, disappoint us in your 
promise but show yourself ready to answer the 
question briefly. 
GOR: There are certain answers, Socrates, that must 
necessarily be given at length; however, I 
will attempt to answer as briefly as possible 
(449b5-c2). 
Socrates method throughout the Gorgias is to subvert Gorgias's 
and Polus's wishes to harangue the assembled people and thus 
control them, and he accomplishes this subversion by 
questioning the rhetors and forcing them to think abstractly. 
As we know from Plato's other dialogues, especially the 
Meno, he seems to view knowledge as recollection stimulated by 
dialectic. He further shows in his dialogues how simply 
relying on and becoming hypnotized by the rhetoric of Gorgias, 
Lysias, etc. breeds passivity and ignorance. By relying on 
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the sophists and politicians for a conception of reality, a 
person is not forced to take an active role in his learning. 
As a result, he gives up parts of himself and loses his 
ability to question. 
However, let's not forget what Plato was up against. The 
spell of beautiful language, sophistic rhetoric, was a 
powerful one, and "the state of pleasurable receptive 
passivity that we have been describing was not only accepted, 
but eagerly sought after" (Connors 51). A good example of 
this receptive passivity is Phaedrus's response to Lysias's 
speech in the beginning of the Phaedrus. "Tell me truly, as 
one friend to another, do you think there is anyone in Greece 
who could make a finer and more exhaustive speech on the same 
subject?" (235e). This surrender to pleasure is what Socrates 
had to fight in the dialogues. Perhaps this is why he not 
only understood the suasiveness of language but the need for 
it in order to convey his message. 
One source of ignorance, then, in the Platonic dialogue 
is the inability of the strawman to understand the necessity 
and value of questioning. If we uncritically accept what we 
are told, remember it, and believe we hold true knowledge, we 
are deceiving ourselves and those who listen to us. So, 
learning can only take place when there is activity present on 
both sides of the conversation: a dialogue, a provocation of 
the soul, a dialectic. 
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We can see the importance of engaged discourse in Plato's 
theory of recollection and we can see the danger in the 
hypnotic power of one-sided discourse. Without engaged 
discourse, no learning takes place. So, by mirroring a 
engaged dialogue in the Phaedrus, he attempts to pull us in 
and force us to take part in order to recollect. 
Context and Rhetoric 
The above three sections, persuasion/morality, knowledge, 
and dialectic are all considerations alluded to in the 
Phaedrus. However, the issue of context, is more directly 
addressed and discussed. In the middle of the Phaedrus, 
Socrates tell Phaedrus that " ..• any discourse ought to be 
constructed like a living creature, with its own body, as it 
were; it must not lack neither head nor feet; it must have a 
middle and extremities so composed as to suit each other and 
the whole work" (264c). And, this living creature must be 
able to adapt to its context to be effective. 
In spoken discourse, it is important for the speech to be 
truthful, and directly related to the audience. Such a 
relationship between the speech and the audience is necessary 
if the speech is to be "written in the soul" of the hearers. 
In order for this to happen, it is necessary that the speaker 
know both about the different kinds of souls, and about what 
kind of speech will be most effective. 
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It appears, then, that the perfection of speech requires 
knowledge of the nature of the soul, how it acts and reacts, 
and even beyond that, the establishing of association between 
souls and speeches. or a classification of both souls and 
speeches and a relating of the two classifications in such a 
way that it would then be pre-determined what kind of speech 
relates best to what kind of soul (271a-b). 
This knowledge of the soul, however, can only be obtained 
by an active discourse. We learn about the soul of another by 
speaking with him. And, we write on his soul through an 
engaged dialectic. So, how does this apply to written 
discourse? 
Since a written article cannot speak with the soul of its 
reader, how does written discourse affect the soul? Socrates 
says that writing makes men neglect their power of memory and 
fills them with empty conceit of wisdom. The best thing a 
written work can do is to serve as a reminder for those who 
know. It is not able to defend itself; nor can it answer 
questions put upon it. Therefore, written discourse is merely 
a reminder as it cannot produce writing in the soul. 
However, if we read written texts with the awareness that 
it is not clear Truth, or avoid what Phaedrus does with 
Lysias's speech, perhaps we are able to invoke some kind of 
dialogue with the text. But, if this is to be a successful 
enterprise, we must keep in mind the context of the writer and 
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try to decipher his soul based on his writing--as I am doing 
with Plato. 
Attempting to invoke a soul of an author is admittedly a 
more difficult task than relating to the soul of a person who 
is speaking to you directly. However, if we keep in mind that 
we have no way of knowing if we are indeed invoking a 
"correct" image of the author's soul, but still maintain an 
active inquiry, we may still be able to have a productive 
experience. 
What we will have to remember is that written words are 
capable of breaking with their contexts, escaping into new 
contexts and taking on meaning that the writer had no way of 
intending. If a written text survives long enough, then, 
readers can make it say anything; this is what Socrates seems 
to want us to be aware of as we rely on written documents for 
"knowledge." 
Now that I have attempted to provide a brief synopsis of 
Plato's conception of morality, knowledge, context, and a 
brief discussion of dialectic, we can move on to investigate 
the two primary types of discourse Plato discusses as mediums 
of provocation in the Phaedrus. These types of discourse are 




In the opening of the Phaedrus Socrates asks Phaedrus 
"Where do you come from, Phaedrus my friend, and where are you 
going?" (227). Phaedrus replies in some detail: 
PH: I've been with Lysias, Socrates, the son 
of Cephalus and I'm off for a walk outside the 
wall, after a long morning's sitting there. On 
the instructions of our common friend Acumenus 
I take my walks on the open roads; he tells me 
that it is more invigorating than walking in 
the colonnades. 
soc: Yes, he's right in saying so. But Lysias, I 
take it was in town. 
PH: Yes, staying with Epicrates, in the house where 
Morychus used to live, close to the temple of 
Olympian Zeus. 
SOC: Well, how were you occupied? No doubt Lysias was 
giving the company a feast of eloquence (227b3). 
So, Phaedrus is going outside the city to purge himself 
of the effects of sitting in the city listening to speeches. 
He is moving outside of what he knows. This is his expressed 
intention, which should, however, be contrasted with the 
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suspicion which Socrates later expresses that actually 
Phaedrus is going outside the city in order to practice the 
written speech he has learned and brought with him from the 
city. 
Also, it is important to note that a written speech has 
lured Socrates out of the city; whereas a spoken one would 
keep him in. Socrates says: 
I am a lover of learning, and trees and open country 
won't teach me anything, whereas men in the town do. 
You seem to have discovered a recipe for getting me 
out (230el-4). 
Phaedrus then reads Lysias' speech. This speech, written 
in first person, is addressed to a boy by a man who claims not 
to be his lover. The theme of the speech is that it is better 
for the boy to grant his favors to a non-lover than to a 
lover. The speech consists mostly of a disorderly and 
repetitive listing of various advantages to be gained by the 
boy if he associates with a non-lover. Much is made of the 
fact that the lover is lacking in self-control and moderation, 
that he acts from passion, and his passion is anything but 
dependable. By contrast, the non-lover is presented as one 
who does not act out of compulsion but rather according to his 
view of his own best interest. 
----------------------··----··---
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As soon as Phaedrus finishes reading Lysias' speech, he 
asks Socrates opinion about it: 
Amazingly fine indeed my friend. I was thrilled by 
it. And it was you, Phaedrus, that made me feel as 
I did. I watched your apparent delight in the words 
as you read. And as I'm sure that you understand 
such matters better than I do, I took my cue from 
you, and therefore joined in the ecstasy of my right 
worshipful companion (234d). 
Phaedrus immediately accuses Socrates of making a joke, and he 
implores Socrates to give his honest judgement of the speech. 
Socrates now refers to the most general defects of the speech 
that it is monotonous and repetitive and, thus, has failed in 
its rhetorical manner. 
This first speech serves as an example of "bad" rhetoric. 
This speech allows Socrates to give us a taste of the more 
general criticism of current theory and practice that will 
come in the second half of the dialogue. Phaedrus is, of 
course, our strawman who needs to realize that he has been 
consumed with words and not thoughts behind them; he admires 
the speech for its expression and organization. Socrates 
concedes that the words are lovely, but the content is poor. 
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He tells Phaedrus: 
Thus, as regards the subject of the speech, do you 
imagine that anybody could argue that the nonlover 
should be favored, rather than the lover, without 
praising the wisdom of the one and censuring the 
other? That he could dispense with these crucial 
points then bring up something different. No, no 
surely we must allow such arguments and forgive the 
orator for using them, and in that sort of field 
what merits praise is not invention, but arrangement; 
but when it comes to nonessential points, that are 
difficult to invent, we should praise arrangement 
and invention too (235e6-236a6). 
So, here we have a speech that is not either suasive or 
moral. It is simply pretty. As a result, Socrates's 
questioning of its value is warranted. 
Socrates's First Speech 
Following his comments on Lysias's speech, Socrates 
prepares to deliver his first speech. He covers his head in 
order to adopt a mock anonymity, invokes the muses, and 
prefaces his speech. According to Socrates' preface, the 
speaker is a lover who is pretending to be a non-lover and who 
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is trying to persuade the beloved that it is better to accept 
a non-lover. So, this speech is presented from the outset as a 
lie. The intent behind the speech has nothing to do with 
truth but only with persuading. 
Socrates begins his speech by establishing a fictional 
dramatic setting within which it makes sense to defend the 
otherwise absurd thesis of Lysias's speech: 
Once there was a boy, or rather a youth, who was 
exceedingly handsome and who had many lovers. Now 
one of these was quite clever and, though he loved 
him no less than the others, he had persuaded the 
boy that he did not love him. And on one occasion 
when courting him he actually argued that one ought 
to grant favors to a non-lover rather than to a 
lover; and this is what he said (237b2-8). 
"This dramatic setting serves also to dissociate Socrates from 
the argument advanced in the speech so that he cannot be 
accused, as can Lysias, of personally advocating a morally 
disgraceful thesis" (Sinaiko 31). In fact, although the 
explicit thesis remains the same, the moral quality of the 
speech is very different from Lysias's. As Hackforth remarks, 
"the whole attitude of the speaker, unlike ... Lysias's speaker, 
shows a real concern (for) the (boy's) moral welfare" (40). 
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Socrates, speaking for the disguised lover, begins the 
speech by insisting on knowing what love is. The first of the 
two main parts of the speech is thus devoted to determining 
what love is and what power it possesses. This element of the 
speech prepares us for the discussion of the dialectical 
method in the second half of the dialogue. 
In the course of the speech, we find that the definition 
of love spelled out at the beginning is inappropriate for the 
kind of love being discussed. In other words, the lover is 
motivated by a different kind of love than the love he 
defines. "Thus the simple dramatic setting, which Socrates 
supplies presumably to give rhetorical coherence to his 
speech, actually suggests, .•. that it is not so much the moral 
content as the dialectical structure of the address that may 
be wanting" (Sinaiko 32). So, the problem with this first 
speech of Socrates's, is its structure. The thesis announces 
a definition and a focus that are not discussed throughout the 
speech. The definition is not specifically isolated or 
discussed, instead, Socrates simply tells a story relying 
solely on pathos and little on logos. This speech has one 
goal--to persuade at any cost. As a result, it is emotionally 
effective, but structurally and somewhat morally unsound. 
Socrates's first speech is marked by a light, playful 
quality. By contrast, his second speech seems very serious; 
in the interlude following his first speech he says he must 
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present another speech to purge himself of the sin he has 
committed. The seriousness of purpose extends even to the 
fictitious speaker who begins the second speech with a flat 
rejection of his previous argument against love and a strong 
implication that he is about to tell his beloved the truth. 
This concern for truth pervades the entire speech, marking it 
distinctly from the first. 
Socrates's Second Speech 
Socrates rejects outright the thesis shared by the two 
previous speeches; the non-lover should be favored because he 
is sane while the lover is mad. In opposition to this thesis, 
Socrates now asserts that the greatest goods come to us by the 
means of madness. He then introduces a division of madness, 
ordinary human madness and god-sent madness. From this 
division Socrates then proceeds to make a further division of 
god-sent madness into three kinds: prophesy, purifications 
and poetic. 
This first part of the speech exemplifies what Socrates 
will describe much later in the dialogue as the method of 
collection and division {Sallis 133). Although there is no 
explicit process of collecting, the speech does begin with a 
collected thesis--madness--and then proceeds to divide it into 
its kinds. This contrasts with Socrates's first speech where 
a broad definition was given to guide all other assertions. 
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So, this third speech not only defines its topic, but 
divides it specifically into distinct parts. Each part is 
then discussed and illustrated in such a way that it comes 
alive through the myth of the charioteer and the horses. The 
third speech illustrates "an example of persuasive speech such 
as a philosopher can use" (DeVries 26). By using the myth 
about the two horses vying for control, Socrates illustrates 
the two methods used in a persuasive argument. The charioteer 
uses both negotiation and outright violence to assert himself 
and maintain both sides of the argument. Perhaps these two 
actions, negotiation and power, have an analogical 
relationship between rhetoric and dialectic in the dialogue as 
a whole. Whereas a rhetorical communication is directed 
exclusively at the potential audience, and dictated by its 
psychological variety, the arguments of the dialectician are 
aimed first at himself, and only second are they shared with 
one who can be awoken to independence. 
This last speech, then, is an illustration of True 
speech. It contains all of the elements Socrates requires for 
a speech to be considered an art: 
soc: The conditions [of True speech] to be 
fulfilled are these. First, you must 
know the truth about the subject that you 
speak or write about; that is to say, you 
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must be able to isolate it in definition, 
and, having so defined it you must next 
understand how to divide it into kinds, 
until you reach the limit of division; 
secondly, you must have a corresponding 
discernment of the nature of the soul, 
discover the type of speech appropriate 
to each nature, and order and arrange 
your discourse accordingly ... (277b5-c5). 
The three speeches provide the matter for the discussion of 
the legitimacy and the foundation of persuasive speech. The 
structure of the second half of the Phaedrus is generated by 
the four principal topics taken up in this part and by the 
relations between the topics. The topics are: 1. the merits 
of written speeches in contrast to the spoken word (257b-
259d), 2. the connection between speech and knowledge (259e-
261a), 3. dialectic in contrast to current rhetoric (26la-
269c), and 4. the relation between speech and the soul (269c-
279c). 
on the surface it appears that the single issue which 
unifies all that is taken up in the second part of the 
Phaedrus is that of rhetoric. Certainly it is the case that 
rhetoric is at issue throughout this part, but, precisely by 
the way in which it is put at issue, the entire discussion 
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transcends the consideration of rhetoric regarded as a mere 
technique of speech-making. The fundamental issue of this 
part of the dialogue is speaking in relation to these issues 
of rhetoric in the narrow sense of a technique. For, 
constructing persuasive speeches appears only as a meager 
component to what is really demanded of one who would speak in 
a rhetorical and dialectical manner. 
Speech and Writing 
The discussion with which the second part of the dialogue 
begins is dedicated to posing the question of the perfection 
of speech. Since this discussion immediately follows the 
conclusion of Socrates' second speech and since the entire 
second part of the dialogue is a reflection of the activity 
practiced in the first part, it is appropriate that Phaedrus 
begins by drawing a brief comparison between the speeches of 
the first part. Specifically, he draws out the contrast 
between the second speech of Socrates and the speech of 
Lysias; the latter was written. The question Phaedrus now 
poses is whether there is something unworthy about being a 
speechwriter. 
PH: The fact is that only the other day, my dear 
good sir, one of our politician was railing at 
him and reproaching him on this very score, 
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constantly dubbing him a 'speech writer'; so 
possibly we shall find him desisting from 
further composition to preserve his reputation. 
soc: What a ridiculous line to take, young man! And 
how utterly you misjudge our friend, if you 
suppose him to be such a timid creature! Am I 
to believe you really do think that the person 
you speak of meant his raillery as a reproach? 
PH: He gave me that impression, Socrates, and of 
course you know as well as I do that the men of 
greatest influence and dignity in political life 
are reluctant to write speeches and bequeath to 
posterity compositions of their own, for fear of 
the verdict of later ages, which might pronounce 
them sophists (257c-d). 
Socrates continues to point out that the politicians who so 
vocally denounce speech writing are also speech writers 
themselves. 
Thus, the suggestion is that Lysias is not to be 
reproached merely on the grounds that he is a speech-writer, 
that, in other words there is nothing intrinsically shameful 
about this practice. 
36 
soc: Then the conclusion is obvious, that there is 
nothing shameful in the mere writing of 
speeches. 
PH: Of course. 
soc: But in speaking and writing shamefully and 
badly instead of as one should, that is where 
the shame comes in, I take it {258d). 
Therefore, the problem is to determine what constitutes 
speaking and writing done beautifully and what constitutes its 
opposite. 
Presumably, a speech which is truly beautiful is a speech 
that is in accord with the beautiful itself. To the 
introduction and initial question regarding the perfection of 
speech there is appended the little myth of the cicadas. The 
connection of the myth to what has preceded it lies in the 
fact that in telling it Socrates is alluding, in a playful 
manner, to the need man has for beautiful speech. This is 
especially evident in the "conclusion" which Socrates draws 
after telling the myth: "Thus there is every reason for us 
not to yield to slumber in the noontide but to pursue our 
talk" {259d). 
Socrates says that, in pursuing their talk, they would be 
imitating the cicadas overhead, who are "singing after their 
wont in the hot sun and conversing with one another" {258e). 
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According to the myth itself, these cicadas only imitate the 
men from whom they sprang: 
The story is that once upon a time these creatures 
were men--men of an age before there were any Muses; 
and that when the latter came into the world and 
music made its appearance, some of the people of 
those days were so thrilled with pleasure that they 
went on singing, and quite forgot to eat and drink 
until they actually died without noticing it. From 
them in due course sprang the race of cicadas, to 
which the Muses have granted the boon of needing no 
sustenance right from their birth, but of singing 
from the very first ... (259b-c). 
Socrates then warns Phaedrus of the need to steer clear 
of "the bewitching siren song" of the cicadas (259a-b). This 
danger is related to the fact that the myth refers to music 
and singing rather than just to speech. 
"Then does not a beautiful speech presuppose that 
the speaker see in thought the truth about the matters of 
which he is to speak?" (259e). Phaedrus answers with a common 
objection: An orator speaking in court does not need to know 
what is really just but only what would seem just. He needs 
to only know what seems not what is. 
----------------
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Socrates responds to Phaedrus by rejecting orators who 
are so unknowing that they might try to persuade Phaedrus to 
buy a horse for military-political purposes while not 
themselves knowing what a horse is but knowing only that 
Phaedrus is of the opinion that a horse is an animal which has 
long ears. Socrates rejects outright the whole prospect of a 
rhetoric which could claim to be an art while, on the other 
hand, requiring no knowledge of the content of speeches. or, 
he rejects all rhetoric that amounts to nothing but sheer 
technique. Technique is void of morality and unable to 
generate the recollection of knowledge. 
Socrates steers the discussion towards the themes of 
dialectic by attempting to justify his claim that rhetoric as 
sheer technique cannot bring about the perfection of speech. 
He says that rhetoric has to do with "a kind of leading of the 
soul by means of logoi" (261a). Socrates demonstrates that 
knowledge is an indispensable prerequisite to good speech. 
Unless the speech is being given in accord with the truth, it 
is misleading and sheer technique. Good speech then, must be 
driven by knowledge and morality and conveyed in a manner that 
engages a mind into activity. 
After Socrates's investigation into the conditions of 
good speaking, then, he embarks on a discussion also of good 
writing. What Socrates says about writing is less clearly an 
indictment than a warning of potential danger: "he stamps its 
---------~~~-- ~--
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packing-case not 'radioactive' but 'volatile'--to be handled 
with care" (Ferarri 204). The reason he seems to be labeling 
writing as such is that the rhetoricians expected and taught 
that writing could provide "something reliable and permanent" 
(275c6). They didn't realize that writing can only serve to 
"remind one who knows that which the writing is concerned 
with" (275c9-d2). 
The reason writing only reminds is because it is like a 
painting, offering only the appearance of living intelligence. 
And, if you attempt to converse with it, you will discover 
that it is no more capable of a reply than a person in a 
portrait, but has only one message which it repeats over and 
over (275d7-9). What is more, it cannot choose the 
appropriate audience for its message but delivers it 
indifferently to those who will and will not understand it. 
And when it encounters criticism, it has no voice to defend 
itself but instead "it always needs its parent to come to its 
help, being unable to defend or help itself" (275e5). 
Socrates continues by saying that the spoken word is more 
desirable as used in the art of dialectic because the speaker 
can select his conversational partner, and actively [plant] 
and [sow] his words founded on knowledge, words which can 
defend both themselves and him who planted them, words which 
instead of remaining barren contain a seed whence new words 
grow up in new characters ••. " (277al-5). Here words can both 
------------ ~~--~~~--
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help themselves and defend their creator rather than require 
defense from him as well as continually generating new speech 
rather than saying the same thing over and over. Therefore, 
"one who is not reliant on the written word for understanding, 
who has no false expectations of it, and who is able to 
supplement its inadequacies in speech, may write about what 
matters to him ... and yet merit the title 'philosopher"' 
(Ferarri 206). 
So the Phaedrus offers us a definition of good speech and 
good writing. Both are driven by a desire to provoke the 
soul, to implant knowledge in the soul and not to manipulate 
and deceive. However, speech is more desirable as it is 
active and present and the speaker can better judge his 
audience and his environment. Speech is conducive to 
dialectic and therefore, to active learning. However, Plato 
does not seem to condemn writing as undesirable. Instead, he 
seems to be providing some cautions for relying on it as a 
purveyor of knowledge. Written words are easily accepted at 
face value as it is impossible to question them. This is a 
dangerous practice. So, Plato says writing is valuable only 
if we can recognize its limitations and read with an active 
mind--engage in a dialogue as best we can. 
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So, if we look again at the definition of an artful 
speech, we see that the four sections with which I began this 
discussion, persuasion/morality, knowledge, dialectic, and 
context, are all involved. A true speech requires: 
1. you know the truth about the subject and 
attempt to convey the truth (morality and 
knowledge). 
2. you define and divide the subject (dialectic) so 
that you can easily arrange it to affect 
(persuade) and engage another's soul 
(dialectic). 
3. discover the type of speech appropriate to each 
nature (context). 
so, a true speech embodies the elements of persuasion, 
morality, knowledge, dialectic, and context. 
In this chapter I have attempted to introduce the 
Phaedrus and my reading of it as well as to provide a 
breakdown of the important concepts related to Plato's 
rhetoric: persuasion/morality, knowledge, dialogue/dialectic 
and context. In Chapter Two, I will address the criticisms of 




The purpose of this chapter is to introduce a survey of 
critical response to Plato's conception of rhetoric and 
writing. I will first respond to the charges introduced at 
the beginning of chapter one, and then I will address three 
critics individually: Jacques Derrida, Brian Vickers, and 
Jasper Neel. There are many other critics, however, these 
three seem to represent the most important and prevalent 
critiques. 
I will also try to bring out the criticisms that deal 
most specifically with the four concepts discussed in chapter 
one: persuasion/morality, knowledge, dialectic, and context. 
The majority of the responses, however, will focus on 
knowledge and dialectic as these two concepts seem to be the 
most prevalent in the criticism. Context and 
persuasion/morality are not attacked as often by the following 
critics. This may be because Plato's philosophy seems to 
drive the criticisms leveled at him, and his philosophy 
produces little discussion of persuasion and context. 
survey of criticism 
In the beginning of this discussion, I listed four often 
cited crimes of Plato. I would like to now discuss them in 
more detail, as well as address a few others. 
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1. In the act of depreciating rhetoric, Plato shows 
himself to be a masterful rhetorician (Corbett 
538). 
Edward Corbett traces the development of rhetoric in 
classical times in a section of his book, Classical Rhetoric 
for the Modern student. After discussing the sophists and the 
value of Isocrates' teachings he says, "We should look briefly 
at what Plato (through his spokesman Socrates) had to say 
about rhetoric, because all the derogatory things that men 
have said about this art down through the ages have their 
roots in Plato's strictures" (538). He further argues that 
Plato's main problem with the rhetoricians was that they were 
not interested in his conception of transcendental truth, but, 
instead, "were mere enchanters of the soul, more interested in 
dazzling their audience than in instructing it" (539). 
Corbett ends his discussion of Plato by stating that although 
Plato does concede the possibility of an art of rhetoric, he 
does not believe any rhetorician capable of implementing it. 
I would like to address his seemingly negative claim that 
Plato was a rhetorician. Plato was a masterful dramatist. 
And, within in his dialogues, he has created a character, 
Socrates, who was a master at speaking. Or as we saw in the 
previous chapter, had mastered the true art of speech. Let's 
assume that Plato's Socrates had a mission to make other 
people aware of how badly they needed to change their 
behavior, a behavior characterized by passive acceptance. It 
------------------- ---
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is highly likely that Plato knew how difficult it is to show 
other people that they behave in a improper way without 
shaming them. Therefore, by using the form of a dialogue, and 
employing the method of dialectic, he allows the characters to 
believe that they have discovered for themselves what Socrates 
already knows. So, yes Plato has a strategy in his dialogues; 
yes, Plato uses rhetoric in his dialogues; but the important 
distinction to us, and I believe to Plato, is that the 
dialogues and Socrates do not profess to offer the Truth. The 
sophisticated and masterful method Plato has chosen to 'throw 
something out there' never claims to be something it is not; 
an important distinction from sophistic rhetoric. 
Here it may also be important to say that it is obvious 
that Plato has an agenda in his dialogues; he knows the 
outcome. However, this does not diminish the experience for 
the reader. As I have already discussed, two of the essential 
elements of the rhetoric in the dialogues are knowledge and 
dialectic. Since, the experience of reading a dialogue is 
taxing and requires a great deal of commitment on the part of 
the reader, it requires a conscious activity. The only way to 
come to know is to engage in a dialectic of sorts with the 
text. So, although Plato and the players may know the 
outcome, the reader does not. And, further, the experience of 
a dialogue is not ever the same for every reader or even the 
same reader doing several readings. The ability to draw the 
reader into an active dialogue is a result of the mastery of 
Plato's writing. 
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2. Plato's view of rhetoric assumes that "knowledge 
of the truth as a precondition of legitimate-or 
'real' rhetoric is unreasonable" (Conley 14). 
Exactly what Plato is predicating about rhetoric in the 
Phaedrus is unclear. It is a problem upon which no universal 
agreement has or will be reached. However, there are some 
areas of general agreement that drive Conley's response. 
First, as discussed earlier, the true rhetorician must have 
knowledge in order to speak well. This is the view to which 
Thomas Conley objects. 
Conley cites the passage in the Phaedrus where Socrates 
asks Phaedrus whether or not the speaker ought to know the 
truth about what he is speaking about. 
SOC: Then does not a good and successful discourse 
pre-suppose a knowledge in the mind of the 
speaker of the truth about his subject? 
PH: As to that, dear Socrates, what I have heard 
is that the intending orator is under no 
necessity of understanding what is truly just, 
but only what is likely to be thought just by 
the body of men who are to give judgement: nor 
need he know what is truly good or noble, but 
what will be thought so, since it is on the 




The most striking feature of the passage is the 
opposition between knowledge and opinion. What we 
have here then is the fundamental issue in the 
continuing quarrel between Plato and the 
rhetoricians. It is in terms of this fundamental 
issue that everything Socrates says about rhetoric 
in the succeeding Stephanus pages--indeed, in the 
entire dialogue--must be understood. What we must 
conclude from this is that, contrary to what has 
sometimes been asserted about the Phaedrus and the 
position contribution Plato makes in it to a 
theory of philosophical rhetoric, Plato has Socrates 
here set conditions for the rehabilitation of 
rhetoric which guarantee that it would redeem itself 
only by an act of self-immolation. Once we have 
understood that, I would contend, we come to see why 
any conception of rhetoric harmonious with Plato's 
ought to be scrupulously avoided (12). 
This distinction between opinion and rhetoric directly 
confronts the concepts of persuasion and morality. Socrates 
accuses the sophists of manipulating people through rhetoric--
this is what he is reacting against in the dialogues. What 
the sophists were doing was enforcing their opinions on the 
masses. They were not allowing for alternate views to be 
expressed through a dialectic; instead, they were casting 
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their rhetorical spells. This type of persuasion is immoral. 
Plato on the other hand develops a rhetoric that is concerned 
with the power of language and how it affects people. By his 
constant push for definitions and clarification, he forces 
people into understanding what they think-- actively obtaining 
knowledge rather than passively accepting opinion. By 
persuading people to question and seek knowledge, Plato allows 
them to come to knowledge and know what their opinions mean. 
Conley continues his discussion by claiming that Plato 
never changes his harsh views on rhetoric; in fact, they grow 
more extreme in the Phaedrus. Conley ends his discussion with 
a bitter warning that Plato's view of rhetoric is a dangerous 
one. 
Knowledge of the truth as a precondition of 
legitimate--or real--rhetoric is entirely 
unreasonable. In the first place, rhetoric arises 
from real questions and problems about matters of 
particular fact which need to be acted upon 
now ...• It is also a little far-fetched to suggest 
that there is a way, in medicine, law, and politics 
alike to deal with present, past, and future 
questions under the rubric of truth (14). 
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If Conley were right, Plato would have made the practice 
of a "reformed rhetoric" impossible. However, I doubt Conley 
is right. I think Oscar Brownstein has an interesting angle 
on this dilemma. He argues that Plato never expected the true 
rhetorician to have true knowledge about everything, but he 
needed a method for sorting out truth from falsehood; that 
method is dialectic (395-98). 
3. "He upheld the validity of absolutism, thereby 
scorning the legitimacy of probability and its 
counterpart opinion" (Golden 17). 
Ernesto Grassi states that Plato maintains"··· only 
dialectic enables the rhetor to transcend his limited 
individual perspective, acquire knowledge rather than 
opinion ... " (234). I think Grassi is correct to say that 
dialectic allows the rhetor to come closer to knowledge. And, 
it seems to be Plato's belief that dialectic allows the 
participants to transcend themselves and come closer to Truth. 
The concepts of Truth and Ideal Forms is where I begin to have 
trouble with Plato. However, I still would maintain that 
there is significant value in Plato's conception of dialectic. 
Social Constructionists, among others who believe that 
knowledge is a social enterprise, criticize Plato on his point 
of objective reality. And, as a result of this difference of 
opinion, disregard Plato entirely. It is possible to accept 
Plato's dialectic without accepting his objective reality. 
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Obviously Plato realized that coming to 'know' was not a 
solitary event; he never has a dialogue with one person 
talking to himself. In the dialogues, Plato most normally 
sets up a social situation where the players engage in 
dialectic in order to learn whatever is on Plato's agenda for 
the day. Plato realizes the importance of conversation among 
many as a means for realizing truth. If we modify the former 
statement slightly and say Plato realizes the importance of 
conversation as a means for constructing a truth, we alter his 
notion of objective reality, but the notion of dialectic 
remains the same. Isn't this a social constructionist notion? 
Kenneth Bruffee in "Collaborative Learning and the 
'Conversation of Mankind'" argues for the value of collective 
thinking and conversation: 
To the extent that thought is internalized 
conversation, then, any effort to understand how we 
think requires us to understand the nature of 
conversation; and any effort to understand 
conversation requires us to understand the 
nature of community life that generates and 
maintains conversation ..•. To think well as 
individuals we must learn to think well 
collectively--that is, we must learn to converse 
well (640). 
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Conversing well requires that the conversants understand 
how knowledge is established within their communities or a 
conversation takes place within "a community of knowledgeable 
peers" (Bruffee 642). "Of knowledgeable peers" is not 
normally a given in the Platonic dialogues; however, dialectic 
is still possible because all within the questioning and 
answering are knowledgeable about something. In the 
dialogues, usually Plato creates one knowledgeable and moral 
individual, Socrates, who leads the other naive players 
through a conversation. It would seem that if all players are 
knowledgeable in a social constructionist perspective, the 
only difference is that the process of coming to know would 
take less time. 
Therefore, if we view dialectic as simply an instrument 
for stimulating active searching for 'knowledge' through 
language, spoken or written, and not as a means to the 
knowledge of True forms, it becomes a useful tool for engaged 
learning of any kind. 
4. Plato attacked the art of rhetoric because 
it represented what he most disliked in 
Athenian life (Hunt 69). 
Did Plato, the man, ever attack anything? How do we know 
how he felt about Athenian life? What did Plato think? 
Plato's The Seventh Letter offers us some insight into his 
philosophy: 
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This, however, I can say about all those who have 
written or will write professing to understand those 
things about which I am in earnest, whether they 
claim to have learned it from me or from others or 
to have discovered it for themselves--in my opinion 
it is not possible for them to have any 
understanding of this matter at all. Concerning 
these things which there is not written work of 
mine, nor will there ever be; for they cannot be 
expressed in words like other studies, but after 
much close study of the matter itself and a long 
companionship with it suddenly, as a fire is kindled 
from a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul 
and then supports itself (241c-d). 
I do not take this statement to mean that Plato never 
developed a coherent philosophy. Instead, I take it to mean 
Plato did not write treatises setting forth his views. What 
he did do is write dialogues. That is to say, Plato himself 
never speaks directly to his readers. Only his characters 
speak, and they speak to each other within a dramatic context. 
Further, "Plato never employs such literary devices as the 
soliloquy or the chorus, which might be interpreted as 
statements directed by the author to his audience" (Sinaiko 
4). Therefore, nothing said in the dialogues can be directly 
ascribed as Plato's philosophy because he never speaks as 
himself. So the opening portion of The Seventh Letter is 
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revealing; Plato never did commit his own philosophical ideas 
to writing. 
So, if Plato never wrote his philosophy in the dialogues, 
what are they for? Don't we need a conclusion in order for 
I 
them to have value? It seems to me that Plato was trying to 
avoid creating a single speaker with the final say; an 
explicit conclusion which could be tied to him. Instead, what 
he seems to be doing is exploring various aspects of a problem 
and then leaving the reader with them. As a result, the 
dialogues become dramas of ideas. 
I would like to now turn my attention to three primary 
opponents of Plato and his ideas regarding rhetoric: Jacques 
Derrida, Brian Vickers, and Jasper Neel. 
Jacgues Derrida 
In discussing Derrida's attack on Plato, I will be 
relying on Christopher Norris's Derrida for my analysis. 
"Plato's Pharmacy" which appears in Dissemination is 
Derrida's challenge of Plato's claims about writing; writing 
as a supplement to speech, with speech 'the better half' as it 
were, in opposition to writing. According to Plato, says 
Derrida, writing is "repeating without knowing"--in Derrida's 
phrase-- a kind of degenerate mnemonics used for rote 
recollection that cannot recapture the Soul's forgotten memory 
of the time of union with the True or the Good (Norris 34). 
Writing, in other words, can only serve as a secondary 
imitation of speech as a primary imitation of knowledge. 
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Derrida's point, however, is that writing is not such a 
mnemonic and that it is no more imitative than speech. Speech 
and writing, therefore, are mutual efforts to decipher that 
which is 'other' to language. 
The myth which brings up the question of writing in the 
Phaedrus tells of the Egyptian King Thamus who has a visitor, 
a god named Theuth, who offers the king the gift of writing. 
The king decides that man is better off without writing and 
declines the offer. His reasons are set forth in detail 
through the King's response: 
soc: But when it came to writing Theuth said, 'Here, 
0 king, is a branch of learning that will make 
the people of Egypt wiser and improve their 
memories; my discovery provides a recipe for 
memory and wisdom.' But the king answered and 
said, '0 man full of arts, to one it is given 
to create the things of art, and to another to 
judge what measure of harm and of profit they 
have for those that shall employ them. 
And so it is that you, by reason of your tender 
regard for the writing that is your offspring, 
have declared the very opposite of its true 
effect. If men learn this, it will implant 
forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease 
to exercise memory because they rely on that 
which is written, calling things to remembrance 
-------------- ----------
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no longer from within themselves but by means 
of external marks. What you have discovered is 
a recipe not for memory, but for reminder. And 
it is not true wisdom that you offer your 
disciples, but only its semblance, for by 
telling them of many things without teaching 
them you will make them seem to know much, 
while for the most part they know nothing, and 
as men filled, not with wisdom, but with the 
conceit of wisdom, they will be a burden to 
their fellows (274e3-275b3). 
Derrida sees this myth as an issue of authority, an issue 
that appears to be secondary--marginal--in the original text. 
According to Christopher Norris, " ... Plato mostly treated 
myths. as an inferior kind of cultural production, useful (the 
best of them) for teaching simple lessons to ignorant minds, 
but otherwise totally unsuited for the purposes of genuine 
enlightenment" (32). But, in the Phaedrus Plato seems to rely 
on this myth as an important piece of writing with an 
essential message. 
Norris claims that Derrida's point regarding the myth is 
that Plato has Socrates trying to 
... convict his opponents of not really knowing 
what they claim to know; of putting forward 
various plausible truth-claims without the least 
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substance of authentic wisdom. The retailers of 
mythology are guilty of this, because they merely 
repeat whatever fabulous events come down from 
tradition or happen to catch the public fancy (32). 
Therefore, by repeating the definition of writing through a 
myth, Plato's credibility and source of knowledge is 
questioned. so, it seems to me that Derrida's criticism here 
is that Plato is repeating a myth, something which cannot 
speak for itself, and relying on it as truth; exactly what 
Plato criticizes about writing. 
When Socrates introduces the myth to Phaedrus, he says, 
"I can tell you the tradition that has come down from our 
forefathers, but they alone know the truth of it" (274c), and 
when he finishes telling the myth he concludes, "For you it 
makes a difference who the speaker is, and what country he 
comes from; you don't merely ask whether what he says is true 
or false" (275c). So, it seems to me that Socrates does call 
the myth into question, both before and after the telling of 
it. And, as a result, doesn't use it as a basis of truth, but 
merely an example that will capture Phaedrus's attention. As 
we discussed in chapter one, Plato knew the value and the 
necessity of keeping his audience's attention. 
Capturing Phaedrus's attention by using a myth is 
probably a rhetorical ploy. As I stated earlier, Plato knew 
the necessity of keeping his readers involved in his writing 
and persuading them that the struggle to understand his texts 
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was valuable. Perhaps Plato did consider the myth as an 
"inferior kind of cultural production, useful ... for teaching 
simple lessons ... " (Norris 32), because the myth isn't what 
ultimately provokes Phaedrus's understanding of Plato's point 
about writing. In fact, it is the resultant discussion about 
the ideas presented in the myth that guide Phaedrus to 
understand. 
The resultant discussion, then, is where the value lies. 
The active, engaged discussion (dialectic) where both socrates 
and Phaedrus question and discuss the myth elicits the 
understanding, the coming closer to knowledge; not the myth 
alone. I would go one step further and say that Plato would 
say that writing which elicits discussion and questioning 
among those who have read it would be valuable as well. It is 
the writing that is simply accepted at face value which is 
dangerous. 
Another issue Derrida argues against Plato is that he 
uses "double-logic" throughout his texts. Derrida focuses on 
the word pharmakon which can mean either poison or cure and is 
used to refer to writing in Plato's Phaedrus. Norris says, 
"Writing is both poison and cure, on the one hand a threat to 
the living presence of authentic (spoken) language, on the 
other an indispensable means for anyone who wants to record, 
transmit or somehow commemorate that presence" (37-38). 
Derrida claims that translators have missed this double 
meaning and have reduced pharmakon to mean simply poison or 
cure, not both. As a result, he is suggesting that "what is 
------------------------------"-------------
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really 'on trial' in these efforts to cope with the pharmakon 
of writing is an ethics of language that has always privileged 
authentic, self-present speech over the vagaries of textual 
inscription" (Norris 38). 
Derrida continues this argument by claiming that when 
Phaedrus asks Socrates to define the form of wisdom that is 
superior to anything acquired from written texts, Socrates 
replies: 'the sort that goes together with learning and is 
written in the soul of the learner' (Dissemination 148 in 
Norris 38). So there becomes 'good' writing, engraved in the 
soul by wisdom and 'bad' writing that "must always corrupt or 
pervert such wisdom, since it can only exist in the debased 
form of inscriptions, material marks, the 'dead letter' or a 
mere supplement to speech" (Norris 39). However, both 
distinctions are operating at once in Plato's texts. 
Here again, I think that Plato's conception of writing 
has been oversimplified. Also, Derrida seems to be 
overlooking the fact that if the Greek work pharmakon does 
exist in the Greek text, Plato put it there knowing what it 
meant. As I discussed in chapter one, Socrates addresses the 
fluctuating nature of language (263-b8) and this double-logic 
Derrida identifies. He discusses how important it is to know 
exactly what you are interpreting words to mean before a 
fruitful conversation can take place. 
Perhaps the dual meaning of pharmakon was an intentional 
ploy. Since Plato does not condemn writing, but offers 
instead warnings of its use, he sees some kind of value. 
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Maybe he even sees a poison and cure. Writing is a poison 
when it is perceived as holding the truth, able to convey 
knowledge to a passive reader. Writing is a cure when it is 
read actively, discussed, and contemplated. Plato uses this 
kind of dual definition also in the Gorgias when he implies 
that rhetoric can be both cookery and medicine (465c). Since 
writing remains in effect beyond the life of the author, it 
can continue to 'speak' infinitely. And since authors cannot 
control what readers may find in their texts, the ways future 
readers may interpret those texts remain inexhaustible. 
However, as long as the texts are being interpreted and not 
simply absorbed, they have a positive function. 
So, it seems to me that Derrida does identify some valid 
areas of debate within the Phaedrus. However, my 
interpretation of Plato and his text allows more room for 
possibilities. Derrida seems to be taking issue with allowing 
anything--speech or writing--to be related with knowledge. He 
has an idea that seems to imply nothing means what it seems, 
and nothing has the authority to claim a tie to knowledge. 
So, his main disagreement with Plato seems grounded in Plato's 
philosophy of objective truths to be discovered through 
dialectic. As I have said above, the notion of objective 
truths and recollection don't have to erase the value of 
Plato's dialectic or the validity of his warnings of passive 
ingestion of material--spoken or written. 
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Brian Vickers 
Brian Vickers's book In Defense of Rhetoric is part 
polemic and part historical survey. The stated purpose is "to 
remove the misapprehensions and prejudices that still affect 
our appreciation of rhetoric" and lead it to being "actively 
distrusted" and "attacked" (vii). Vickers's effort at 
rehabilitation derives from what he identifies as the 2,500 
year old critique of rhetoric begun by Plato in the Gorgias 
and mistakenly perpetuated to the present by those who have 
followed him in decrying rhetoric. 
The result, according to Vickers, is that throughout its 
history as a discipline, rhetoric has been continually 
fragmented and marginalized, and thus, by implication, its 
theoretical significance to society has been seriously 
injured. 
Vickers gives the impression that the primary motive for 
writing a history of rhetoric is the hostility against 
rhetoric; Plato's hostility. "Plato's hostility to rhetoric 
is so great, and his misrepresentation of it so extreme, that 
it is impossible to take his accounts as reliable history or 
exposition" (15). He argues that Plato, rhetoric's 
prototypical accuser, is unfair; he is biased; he only tells 
part of the story, his. In fact, Plato is such an enemy that 
Vickers devotes the whole of chapter two and a good part of 
chapter three to a discussion of Plato. He seems to come to 
two conclusions: Plato wrote good examples of rhetoric and 
Plato was a totalitarian who wanted to usurp free speech. 
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Vickers claims that Plato's "own dialogues included both 
theoretical discussions of eloquence and practical examples, 
just like self-confessed rhetoric-books" (15). He uses the 
example that Plato constructed Lysias' speech in the Phaedrus 
to be inept so he could later have Socrates outshine it with 
his spoken one. He further claims that Socrates' speeches are 
"brilliant examples of the rhetorical practice of arguing in 
utramgue partem, on both sides of an issue" (16). 
So, is Plato really a hypocrite? Does he hate what he 
does so well? I doubt it. I have discussed in chapter one 
that Plato knew the suasive nature of language and was adept 
at creating persuasive speeches. However, the important 
distinction between Plato's persuasion and the persuasion 
offered by the sophists is that Plato realized the moral 
implications of persuasive language. So, if Plato sets up 
examples of bad speeches and lets us discover through 
dialectic why they are bad, there is nothing to criticize. It 
seems to me that the examples Plato offers in the Phaedrus are 
intended as just that--examples of different types of 
speeches. In order for Plato to make his points in the second 
half of the dialogue, the examples are necessary. Again, the 
difference between Plato's speeches and the speeches he 
attacks is the intent behind them. Plato is providing his 
"brilliant" speeches in order to illustrate to Phaedrus how 
manipulative they can be; however he is not manipulating 
Phaedrus. So, if Plato is indeed providing a rhetoric book, 
as Vickers claims, so be it. However, the dialogues are much 
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more than mere illustration of technique; they also provide 
discussion and analysis of the affect discourse has on people. 
The dialogues raise peoples' consciousness regarding "good" 
and "bad" or moral and immoral uses of language. This goal 
seems to be a very noble one. 
So, Vickers criticism that Plato is a brilliant rhetor 
and creates nothing more than textbooks on rhetoric, contains 
an element of truth. However, as I have discussed above, I 
don't think Plato's goals were that simple nor does he limit 
himself to creating a textbook. For Plato does much more in 
the dialogues than provide speeches for imitation. 
The majority of Vickers's chapter two continues with a 
comparison of what Plato said in his dialogues about rhetoric 
over a period of thirty years. He tries to show how Plato's 
hatred for Athenian democracy, especially the use of oratory 
exercised to influence opinion at public gatherings, drives 
his criticisms of rhetoric. He portrays Plato as a man living 
on the fringes of society, who is violent, and who did not 
want the 'masses' to know anything. Therefore, he used the 
dialectic form because it "involved individuals, rhetoric 
approached the masses, and was therefore corrupt" (88). 
Vickers reduces the dialectic form to a genre of oppression 
instead of enlightenment. 
Vickers claims that dialectic is unnecessary and unfair. 
By concentrating on a priori truths and virtue through 
instruction or dialectic, Plato was reserving knowledge for 
the elite class of philosophers. And, the very fact that a 
--------------------·----
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teacher or Socrates was needed in order for dialectic to be 
successful created another imbalance, but this time between 
teacher and student. 
So, if we take Vickers's claims to be true, dialectic is 
nothing more than an elitist method of allowing the few to 
know while the masses remain in a controllable ignorance. In 
fact, Vickers goes so far as to say that the Sophists were 
basically social constructionists: "the citizen (sophists) 
learn by growing up in a family and community, where mores 
condemning immorality and impiety as anti-social are passed on 
from one generation to the next by custom" (122) and "virtue 
is defined and shared by all citizens: they are open to all" 
(122). And, finally, in a sophistic interchange "when the 
debate is conducted properly neither side wins an exclusive 
victory--unlike Socratic dialectic" (123). 
So, Vickers's main problem with dialectic seems to be the 
power he perceives it to hold. I will agree that Socrates 
always has the upper hand in the dialogues. However, I don't 
think that the value of dialectic relies upon one person 
having all knowledge and others in the conversation having 
none. As I have said, the value of dialectic is the activity, 
the questioning, the constant interpretation of what is being 
said and done. If the power imbalances are there in Plato, 
OK. But, the imbalances aren't necessarily required for a 
successful dialogue. 
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As far as Plato wanting to rule the world and his being 
elitist, I don't know. I do agree with Vickers's statements 
that Plato was unhappy with the Athenian government, but I 
find it hard to believe that a man who seems driven to engage 
people in active questioning would want to empower them. 
Questioning very seldom is allowed in a dictatorship. I do 
believe that Plato did privilege philosophers over the masses, 
but I don't see how that lessens his ideas or makes them less 
important. If this kind of thinking were to hold true, we 
should discount the sophists based on Vickers's privileging of 
them. 
It seems to me, then, that Vickers's main problem with 
Plato is related to Plato's politics. Vickers seems to 
interpret everything Plato has done in light of politics and 
not what I feel was Plato's main concern--self-education. The 
self-education that requires questions like, "Why do I believe 
what I believe?" "Are my beliefs true?" And, this latter 
enterprise seems to me to be especially valuable. 
Jasper Neel 
Neel in his book, Plato. Derrida and Writing, 
ambitiously attempts "to clear a space in which composition 
studies can finally be liberated from philosophy" (202), and 
specifically from Derrida and Plato. Neel's primary purpose 
seems to be to "save" writing from philosophy by separating 
the two. And, until this separation takes place, writing will 
never be considered a legitimate field of study. Therefore, 
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with this book Neel attempts "to clear a place in intellectual 
history where the act of writing is neither shameful (as Plato 
would have it) nor philosophical (as Derrida would have it)" 
(xiii). 
Neel divides his book into two separate discussions: 
first a deconstructive reading of the Phaedrus and then an 
analysis of Derridean deconstruction. In the first four 
chapters, my main concern, Plato is represented as the synonym 
of bad teaching and bad writing. Neel portrays Plato as 
seeing writing as a "necessary but unfortunate medium through 
which we express our inevitably flawed approximation of pre-
existing truth" (235). Because of Plato, then, composition 
teachers are expected to simply discern the difference between 
what students actually write and what they should be writing--
an ideal form. As a result, Neel claims that in order for 
composition studies to be judged as a legitimate field of 
study, Plato must be silenced. 
Jasper Neel begins chapter one of Plato. Derrida. and 
Writing with the words "However uncomfortable it may make us, 
Plato undeniably condemns writing. No amount of interpreting 
can get around the fact .•• " (1). Neel bases this claim 
primarily on the Thamus/Theuth section of the Phaedrus 
discussed in the Derrida section. For in this section, Neel 
argues, we will find a writer (Plato) condemning his own 
medium, and thus, rendering himself totally unreliable. Neel 
states, "He's [Plato] wrong about writing, and his error is 
compounded because he is writing to make his case" (5). 
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Neel interprets the Thamus/Theuth myth to be saying that 
writing should be damned by all serious students and teachers 
alike. And, since Plato included it in his dialogue, he also 
feels writing should be damned. strangely enough, however, 
nowhere in the text do I find Socrates making this kind of 
strong claim. Perhaps it is because there are really no 
points in the text where this emphatic condemnation takes 
place. What I do find in Plato's text instead of 
condemnations are some valid warnings about the reliability of 
the written word. 
If we take a closer look at the myth, we clearly see 
Plato's caution for us: "If men learn this, it will implant 
forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to exercise 
memory because they rely on that which is written, calling 
things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by 
means of external marks" (275al-6). Plato says that knowledge 
cannot come from outside the self. Instead, in order to have 
knowledge we must employ the art of dialectic. "The 
dialectician selects a soul of the right type, and in it 
plants and sows his words founded on knowledge, words which 
can defend both themselves and him who planted them" (276e6-
277). Therefore, knowledge cannot come from merely reading 
another's words, but can only come when those words are full 
of the life of the speaker who can argue, defend, and plant 
them in our souls. so, Plato is not saying "writing should be 
condemned", but he says, instead, that reading should be 
active. 
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Instead of damning writing in the Phaedrus, as Neel 
suggests, Plato issues three primary warnings about relying on 
writing to convey knowledge on its own: 
1. Anything left in writing will not be clear and 
certain. 
2. Students will lose their ability to think and 
will not be able to gain true knowledge through 
writing. 
3. Students will begin to accept writing as an 
authority simply because it is written and 
lose their ability to question. 
Jasper Neel confronts all of these warnings in his text, 
but he considers them indictments against Plato. I will now 
provide a brief discussion of each warning and Neel's response 
to them. 
Warning 1: Can anyone claim to ever know clearly and 
certainly what Plato was trying to convey in the dialogues? 
Even Jasper Neel--who does seem to claim he knows Plato better 
than Plato himself--says, "In fact, Phaedrus is reducible to 
an aporia--a set of gaps, dead ends, complexities, and 
contradictions so entangled as to render the text if not void 
at least so undecidable as to be disregardable" (5). (Vickers 
would go with this) I grant that Plato's writing is, at 
times, undecipherable, even inconsistent in places. But, if 
Plato is a master illustrator of rhetoric as Brian Vickers 
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claims, perhaps he was purposely creating an environment where 
words could not possibly work on the reader. Instead, the 
reader must work with the words in order to gain some 
knowledge. 
What must happen when a student reads is that she 
actively engage herself with the text--create a dialogue of 
her own with the text. As Derrida says, texts are open to 
interpretation clearly after the author is gone. And, 
interpretation requires activity, an engaged mind. 
Warning 2: As far as students losing their ability to 
think, Nee! offers a prime example of how his students have 
lost this ability. Nee! discusses two experiences he had with 
separate composition classes. He claims that by asking his 
students to question their own values and belief systems while 
writing [he calls this Platonic writing], they couldn't 
produce what he expected. Their internal securities were in 
such an upheaval that they could produce nothing but objective 
texts that only proclaimed themselves as essays and nothing 
more. 
Nee! goes on to say that teaching "Platonic" writing does 
nothing but cause too much cognitive dissonance for the 
students and, as a result, they don't learn how to communicate 
(84). I am simplifying his argument, but it is absurd 
nonetheless. The job of educators asks them to encourage 
their students to confront themselves directly and ask "Why do 
I believe this?" No learning can go on without this activity. 
We see Plato illustrating a similar student/teacher 
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problem in the Phaedrus. Phaedrus, at the beginning, accepts 
Lysias' speech without question. And when Socrates begins 
forcing Phaedrus to question the beliefs he previously held, 
he becomes embarrassed. At this point Socrates had two 
options: quit pressuring Phaedrus and allow him to become 
like Neel's students or push him to come to grips with his 
beliefs. The difference between Socrates' student and Neel's 
becomes obvious when Socrates pushes Phaedrus to learn from 
the internal questioning--activation of the soul--while Neel 
allows his students to forego the pain of coming to some sort 
of resolution with their beliefs. 
Warning 3: Last, then, Socrates discuses the authority 
of the written text, as did Derrida. Since we cannot know 
clearly and certainly what Plato was trying to convey 
throughout his dialogues, we obviously cannot say the text is 
without question. Nor should we ever say a text is without 
question, for when we do, we become passive and allow language 
to work on us. We lose the dialectic activity that engages 
and instructs us. Here again, the example of Lysias and 
Phaedrus is appropriate. Phaedrus accepts Lysias's speech 
without question, and, in doing so, gives up his claim to 
knowledge (recall the Meno). However, through an active 
question and answer session with Socrates, he is able to see 
the unreliability of the tangible. 
Here, once again, Neel offers what he seems to feel is a 
critique on the matter of authorial authority. "The text 
[Phaedrus] is always there for one more interpretation" (19). 
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If we take interpretation to mean discussion, thinking, 
questioning, activity, which I do, then Plato has been 
successful. 
As I have shown in this chapter, then, Plato has many 
opponents. Some of them have valid criticisms and some of 
them seem to be oversimplifying what I perceive to be Plato's 
main concerns--dialectic and self-knowledge. Both sides of 
the debate have arguments that are compelling, so I guess its 
up to the reader to actively question hisjher beliefs and come 
to understand what they believe on this issue. one thing that 
both sides illustrate, however, is that Plato has historically 
been very important to us. He has offered us a unique study 
on the uses and purpose of language. And, of course a method 
to come to understand the language. 
In the last chapter, I will try to apply my favorite 
Platonic concept, dialectic, to general pedagogy and writing 
instruction. Obviously, I feel that there is room for Plato 
in the modern classroom, despite his perceived flaws. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Classical rhetoric influences current writing instruction 
even though current rhetorical theory has rejected many of its 
assumptions and pedagogy. This rejection is based on the 
following definitions: 
Classical rhetoric assumes the existence of a 
knowable world, universally acknowledged truths 
about the world, and a human mind that learns by 
memorizing these truths and then applying them 
formulaically to experience. Modern rhetorical 
theory, in contrast, assumes that knowledge of the 
world is provisional and generated collaboratively 
in discourse (Knoblauch and Brannon, quoted in 
Bizzell and Herzberg 20). 
Although not all contemporary historians of rhetoric 
agree with Knoblauch and Brannon, it is fair to say that 
"Classical rhetoric" as defined above is really more of an 
extension of Plato's philosophy of Ideal Forms and not 
specifically his rhetorical theory. As we have seen, his 
rhetorical theory emphasized not only arriving at the Truth, 
but it placed much greater emphasis on the activity of 
discourse than on arriving at Truth. So, it seems that those 
composition teachers who reject Plato on the basis of his 
attack on rhetoric, may, instead, be rejecting him on the 
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basis of his philosophy without even bothering to understand 
the possibilities his definition of True rhetoric offers. 
Platonic Rhetoric 
The potential of using Platonic theory as a basis of 
assignments in composition has not been fully explored because 
Plato's idea of rhetoric has traditionally been ignored, 
misunderstood, or unknown. For example, as we have seen in 
Chapter Two, the conventional twentieth century thought about 
Plato is that he condemned rhetoric. And, if this were true, 
why would anyone try to derive useful assignments from a 
theory which condemns what is being taught? But, remember, 
Plato did not condemn rhetoric. What he condemned was the 
rhetoric of the sophists, while at the same time offering an 
acceptable rhetoric. But if we ignore this True rhetoric, it 
is easy to pass Plato by, thinking of him as only a critic 
with little to offer pedagogy. 
Plato's rhetoric bypasses categorization (the kind we 
feel most comfortable with thanks to Aristotle), and instead, 
relies on the "active interchange of rhetoric and dialectic, 
between two sides actively engaged in a search" (Welch 100). 
In Plato's heated attack against sophistic rhetoric in 
Gorgias, he argues against the prescriptions that the 
sophistic handbooks relied on. He vehemently expressed his 
disgust for the absence of intellectual inquiry in some of 
these handbooks and the teachers who used them. Plato could 
not envision a genuine rhetoric that did not deal with 
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activity between the "teacher" and the "student." 
Those critics who interpret Plato as completely opposed 
to rhetoric tend not to consider the existence of the dialogue 
form in Plato and the fact that it requires active reading. 
They disregard the readerly resistance that Plato demands in 
the form of a dialogue, a resistance that assures 
participation by the reader. The critics emphasize a limited 
aspect of Plato's conceptualization of rhetoric; they look 
exclusively at his attack at sophistic rhetoric or his theory 
of Ideal Forms and ignore his alternative rhetoric and his 
illustration of dialectic. 
Dialectic and Dialogue 
When discussing Plato and pedagogy with a friend who also 
teaches composition, I learned that she sees a separation 
between the concept of dialectic from the activity of dialogue 
in the classroom. I found this interesting, as I consider 
them part and parcel of the same thing: an active interchange 
towards the pursuit of knowledge. Her distinctions were as 
follows: 
1. Dialectic: an activity where the teacher knows 
the answers and leads the students to them. 
2. Dialogue: an activity where neither the teacher 
or the students know the answers and they arrive 
at answers together. 
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These distinctions led me to seek other definitions. 
What I found, essentially, was that most contemporary scholars 
of rhetoric want to reject the idea of the teacher leading the 
students to truth; an activity they associate with Plato. 
Thus, dialectic becomes a marked term and dialogue or 
conversation takes its place in contemporary usage. 
What seems to really be at issue here is not the 
definition of dialectic or dialogue, but where the emphasis 
should be placed: process or product. If we accept the 
activity of dialectic to be one where the teacher leads the 
students to Truth, then the emphasis is on the end results; 
what the student knows at the end of the discussion. However, 
if we view dialectic as an active pursuit of knowledge with 
engaged conversation between the teacher and student, the 
process becomes the focus. As teachers, we seem more 
concerned with what the student can re-tell or re-write at the 
end of the class than we are with how the student comes to his 
answers. 
What I would like to do now is discuss the ramifications 
of accepting the traditional definition of Plato's dialectic, 
focus on what the student can re-tell, and then discuss the 
ramifications of my revised definition of Platonic dialectic 
(i.e. how a student comes to know) which we have seen in 
chapters one and two. I will look at both conceptions of 
dialectic from, first, the teacher and then the student's 
perspective. 
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After the discussion of dialectic and general pedagogy, I 
would like to address writing instruction in particular. I 
will address how the concepts discussed in chapter one--
context, morality/persuasion, and knowledge--as elements of 
dialectical rhetoric in a composition classroom. 
Teacher and "Classical" Dialectic 
If a teacher were trained to use a method of dialectic to 
lead a student to Truth in her classroom, she would be working 
with several assumptions. First, if she is leading students 
to Truth, there is a Truth to be found. Second, the teacher 
knows the Truth and can convey it to her students. Both of 
these assumptions seem to point to one issue: power and 
control. Where is the power in the classroom under this 
approach? The power rests solely with the teacher since it is 
her job to convey Truth to her students so that they can re-
tell it back to her. 
Students are trained to believe what their teachers tell 
them; teachers possess the Truth. so, leading them to 
"correct" answers is a matter of the teacher deciding what is 
correct and enforcing it in her classroom. If we decide that 
there is no Truth or that truth is socially constructed, power 
is removed from the teacher and given to the students; a 
premise that seems to frighten many teachers. Power is a 
difficult thing to relinquish. 
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students and "Classical" Dialectic 
If we look at this absolutist end for dialectic from the 
perspective of the student, power, again, seems to be the 
dominant issue. As I have stated above, students are used to 
accepting at face value what is told to them; students are not 
taught to think on their own. If the teacher is perceived as 
having all the answers, the students perceive their roles as 
empty vessels awaiting to be filled with the Truth. If the 
teacher is emplo~ing "classical" dialectic, she will be 
forcing the students to participate, but she will have the 
power and the answers. So, even though she is enforcing a 
question;answer session in her classroom, she has the control 
to guide and mold the conversation in the direction she 
desires; the students know this. 
Anyone who has ever tried to maintain a question/answer 
session with an introductory course of any kind will find 
herself running into a brick wall. Since students believe 
that there is a Right answer to any question a teacher asks, 
they are reticent to answer for fear of being wrong or 
embarrassed. I have seen new teachers in both secondary and 
college courses attempt to lead their students to the desired 
answers through question;answer sessions who succeed at 
nothing more than terrifying and alienating their students. 
All for one simple reason, they are more concerned with 
getting the Right answers "out there" before the end of class 
(product) and controlling the answers of their students in the 
process. I remember one case in a high school very vividly. 
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I was observing a student teacher in a high school who 
was told that he needed to engage the students in a 
questionjanswer session more often (rather than lecturing all 
of the time) in order to force the students to think about 
what they had read. The new teacher was, first of all, angry 
because he had prepared a lecture and didn't want to "waste 
time" fishing for answers and, second, so convinced that his 
interpretation of the book, The Catcher in the Rye was so good 
that all should hear it. Besides, it would be on the test. 









What was the message in the book? 
{silence} 
Come on, you guys, did you read it? We 
have a lot to cover today. 
{nods} 
Well, then, what was the theme? 
Psychological problems? 
Not really. Anyone else? 
Growing up? 
Close. We've go a lot to cover, so 
I'll get us started. It was about a 
rebellion against normative values. 
{teacher begins to lecture and students 
begin to take notes}. 
Ok, what about Holden? What are we 





He was a basket case! 
How did his psychological problems 
relate to the theme of rebellion? 
He went nuts to rebel? 
The teacher began to lecture again at this point and simply 
had the students copy notes from the blackboard for the rest 
of the hour. He then gave them a prepared quiz over their 
discussion. 
This example shows how the teacher, when presented with 
the "wrong" answers, limited his students confidence to 
respond. Also, he simply told them the answers when he had 
become exasperated, not wanting to "waste time" allowing them 
to figure things out. The last thing this case illustrates is 
that the teacher took the liberty of manipulating student's 
answers to fit his interpretation (student 3 and teacher). By 
forcing these connections, the student's process in forming an 
interpretation is further limited. The students finally quit 
trying when their answers became foreign to them and the 
teacher's answers dominated. 
The whole concept of giving students a pre-prepared quiz 
at the end of each class, enforces the fact that the teacher 
has an agenda that must be followed in order to do well in the 
class. He did this every class, so the students knew what to 
expect. 
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This particular teacher was very formal and gruff with his 
students which may have added to their fear to respond to his 
questions. However, his use of the question/answer session 
seemed to be so overwhelmingly weighted to the fact that he 
did in fact hold the correct and true answers that the 
students knew the questions were simply avenues for the 
teacher to express himself; there was never any room for an 
alternative interpretation. 
This particular classroom where the teacher felt he was 
employing a "dialectical method" of teaching, did nothing but 
enforce a severe power distinction and focus on product, what 
could be re-told on a test. This seems to be a common mode of 
teaching in both high schools and college classes. 
Perhaps the fact that this particular teacher felt he did 
have the answers, Truth, to convey and that his students 
weren't ever going to understand without his simply telling 
them the answers doomed his use of "dialectic." However, it 
also reveals that there is a certain skill involved in asking 
the questions in order to engage the students, as well as a 
skill in allowing the students a certain amount of freedom to 
discover how and why they think particular things. 
So, "classical" dialectic can be very detrimental to 
students. It can enforce a kind of passivity or quest for 
pleasing the teacher and not the quest for knowledge. The 
power problem further comes into play when the teacher begins 
to use "dialectic" merely as a power game with the students 
instead as a method for conveying and discovering knowledge. 
79 
I don't know one student who has never had an instructor 
who expected her to play games in the classroom. By "play 
games" I mean answer or respond to the teacher's questions in 
the way the teacher expected; learn the teacher's agenda and 
play according to the rules of the class. Again, I have had 
an instructor who ran her classroom in this manner. This 
class was a graduate literature class on women's literature. 
It was not billed as a feminist theory class or a feminist 
perspective class; however, we all learned rather quickly that 









What was the underlying theme in 
Frankenstein? 
The battle between good and evil? 
Well, okay, maybe, but what was the 
important theme? 
The birth myth. Or how Victor envied 
women's ability to give birth but he 
was not a nurturing parent •.... 
YES. 
Well, the birth myth seems important, 
but I didn't view it as the dominant 
theme. The focus seemed more on the 
duality of nature, to me anyway. 
Well, it is a theme, but your being a 
bit ambitious for the scope of this 
class. 
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Well, needless to say, Student 1 quit making comments. In this 
case, student 2 played all of the instructor's games in class. 
She knew what to say and how to say it in order to get a 
favorable response. we soon figured out that every question 
the teacher asked had an answer that dealt with the oppression 
of women. If you phrased your answer so that it dealt with 
that one specific theme, you arrived at a Truth. If not, you 
were dismissed or considered to be on the "wrong track." 
This "classical" dialectic reminds me more of a 
representation of sophistic rhetoric. Sophistic rhetoric, 
speeches by Gorgias or by teachers, was capable of persuading 
its audience that knowledge was being conveyed through the 
rhetor's words. As a result, those listening would memorize 
what was being said and simply accept it as truth. This kind 
of blind belief in what the teacher says stagnates, and 
finally, hampers the ability to actively learn. This kind of 
discourse does not require thought or effort; it does not 
inspire learning. 
So, the main problem with the "classical" rhetoric I have 
been discussing is related to power and to product. If we are 
to enforce a dialectic that serves to eventually stifle or 
manipulate students into playing into the teacher's agenda, we 
are definitely violating Plato's view of dialectic. We are 
not enforcing engagement, but conformity. 
I realize that both cases I have used here to illustrate 
the abuse of dialectic are taken from literature classes. 
This was not intentional. Important distinction? I'm not sure. 
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So, if we disregard "classical" dialectic then, and move 
on to my modified definition, process-centered activity, are 
power and product still problems? Yes. 
Teacher and Dialectic 
Life would be all well and good if we could buy into 
certain philosophies that proclaim the death of all authority 
and control. Well and good until we needed to get something 
done, that is. So, even if we modify the classical definition 
of dialectic to be more egalitarian, the teacher must still 
possess some kind of control. 
The constraints of academia force teachers to assume 
certain responsibilities, be that good or bad, and some of 
these include, evaluation, transference of certain 
information, and following certain rules. In order for these 
things to get done, teachers must assume some power in the 
classroom. However, this power does not have to be so all 
encompassing that the students are relegated to simple 
underlings. 
If we view dialectic as an active interchange between 
students and teachers in order to arrive at answers and not 
Truth, then the biggest power problem is abolished. However, 
we cannot be so idealistic as my friend in her definition of 
dialogue, teachers and students learning together, because 
teachers do know subject-specific material that the students 
do not; that is why the students are in the class. However, 
the teacher does not know everything about everything and it 
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is in both her best interest and the students to accept that 
fact. 
Once teachers relinquish some control and lose some fear 
of admitting that they are not possessors of all knowledge, 
dialectic, engaged learning, can occur. It would also be 
naive to state that although teachers normally know more than 
their students, that they never learn from them. However, 
this seems to be a contention of the "classical" dialectic 
method. So, what is the value of this open forum of 
discourse? 
One of the major problems I have encountered in my 
classroom is trying to instill confidence in my students. As 
I have discussed above, students are used to being told what 
is True and are not used to being forced to come to grips with 
what they think (know?) and why. And, since the major focus 
of my classroom is to create a forum for many questions and 
answers, I force my students into an uncomfortable position of 
questioning themselves as well as me. 
I have found that my students find questioning themselves 
even more difficult than questioning me. Once we have 
established a confident classroom where they feel comfortable 
questioning and answering, no power plays, no preconceived 
Truths, I try to stop doing the questioning of my students and 
force/encourage them to take over the role of questioner. By 
doing this not only do I relinquish my role as the center of 
the classroom, but I also relinquish the control of where the 
conversation will go; what information gets out. 
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When a teacher enters a classroom, most likely she has a 
certain agenda in mind. She can choose to enforce that agenda 
at all costs or she can follow the students' lead and take the 
time see how their agendas arrive out of class material. 
Is this re-definition of dialectic still Platonic? Yes, 
in several ways. First, the idea of Truth is simply shifted 
to a more socially constructed definition. By engaging in 
discussions with our students, engaging their minds in an 
active search for answers, we are searching for answers that 
we can support with our knowledge. Since we cannot know Truth 
and we cannot realistically search for its existence, we must 
shift our emphasis to truth. However the importance lies in 
the activity of the search and not entirely in the end 
product. 
Second, this view of dialectic also supports the notion 
of recollection--recollecting what we have learned. Again, 
our definition of recollection is not tied to Truth but to 
understanding. By using the questionjanswer format we are 
forcing students to question what they realize they know as 
well as discover how much they know. This type of 
recollection instills confidence in students. 
Third, although the teacher does not always play the role 
of Socrates, someone does. There is always a questioner and a 
group of responders. The emphasis simply shifts from one 
person to many. The catch for the teacher comes to be the 
ability to teach how to question effectively. 
--- -~~~~~~~---~-- -~--
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Students and Dialectic 
Dialectic benefits the student in many ways, although 
they may not realize it right away. Forcing students to 
question themselves, their belief systems and values, results 
in shaking up their internal securities. Creating inner 
turmoil in students makes them uncomfortable. 
By forcing the students to question, we force them to 
take control of their educations. They can no longer simply 
play the part of a passive receptacle. Instead, they are 
forced to take charge of their learning process; they cannot 
rely on the teacher for the Right answers. This is a 
difficult concept for students to grasp and takes time to 
develop. However, once they take charge of their learning, 
they will see how much more effective it is, as well as 
fulfilling. 
Dialectical Rhetoric and Writing Instruction 
Once students come to grips with what they think and why, 
then they need a medium to express what they have found. They 
need to effectively transform their ideas into writing. Plato 
recognized that one or more primary ideas underlie what we 
choose to say, and when these ideas are not clearly 
understood, we are in trouble. A transformed, enhanced, 
clarified understanding of our ideas must be the basis for our 
writing. Plato offers us, in the Phaedrus, a clear 
discussion of how to construct a clear argument in order to 
avoid misunderstandings with our audience. 
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In order to avoid misunderstandings, Plato found the use 
of definitions extremely important for clarity. A definition 
should be as free of unclear words as possible (Phaedrus 263-
264). And when one can arrive at this clear definition, 
presumably through dialectic, he has a thesis, a clear 
starting point for his argument. In the Phaedrus, Lysias's 
speech is offered to us an example of a speech that does not 
provide a clear definition or follow a cogent organization to 
support the definition: 
soc: ... Did Lysias at the beginning of his 
discourse on love compel us to conceive 
of it as a certain definite entity, with a 
meaning he had himself decided upon? And did 
he proceed to bring all his subsequent 
remarks, from first to last, into line 
with that meaning? ... No, he doesn't 
seem to get anywhere near what we are 
looking for; he goes about it like a man 
swimming on his back, in reverse, and 
starts from the end instead of the 
beginning; his opening words are what 
the lover would naturally say to his boy 
only when he had finished ... (263d-264). 
Socrates then provides the structure for an effective speech, 
"A speech must begin with a preamble and next comes exposition 
accompanied by direct evidence; thirdly, indirect evidence; 
fourthly probabilities; besides which there are the proof and 
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supplementary proof ..• " (266e-267). Although, Socrates offers 
a definite structure for organizing discourse, he does not 
stop there. We see at the beginning of the Phaedrus Phaedrus 
believing that Lysias's speech is a great example of a 
persuasive speech. If Socrates would not have raised all of 
the questions about its structure and content, Phaedrus would 
have memorized Lysias's speech and used it for a model for all 
his speeches. Through their analysis, Phaedrus and Socrates 
come to know why the speech is structurally bad, as well as 
determining the manipulative nature of the language. So, 
although Plato realizes that structure is important to the 
logic of an argument, he also realizes that rhetoric is more 
than structure or technique as he illustrates through his two 
speeches. If we were to teach our students nothing but how to 
imitate structure we would be teaching them skills--not 
dialectical rhetoric. 
According to Kathleen Welch, composition studies seem to 
be relying on a sophistic rhetoric or a teaching of imitative 
techniques, and composition and rhetoric studies have 
forgotten their functions as faculties. As a result, 
"rhetoric and composition without their vital functions as 
faculties ultimately become trivial and boring" (94). They do 
not force the students into any kind of active inquiry through 
their writing. students should view dialectical rhetoric as a 
bridge between structure and knowledge. Their writing is the 
method by which they come to grips with what they know, what 
they want to say, and how they want to say it. 
---~ ~~-------~~-~ ---
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Plato's rhetoric does just these things as it "relies •.. 
on the active interchange of rhetoric and dialectic between 
two sides actively engaged in a search" (Welch 100). By 
simply telling a student "how to" write (if this is possible) 
and giving her a handbook, we fail to engage the writer in any 
meaningful conversation. This type of instruction will "deny 
activity between the message sender and the receiver, and 
therefore [allow] the soul to atrophy" (Welch 100). 
Welch goes on to say that almost all freshman writing 
books emphasize a static, rule-centered, passive rhetoric--a 
technical rhetoric which requires very little thought or 
interaction from the students. These books, in effect, then 
stimulate or engage very little of the student. students 
become Menos who can't distinguish between themselves and the 
world in which they are writing. All they are being asked to 
do is memorize and repeat, either verbally or written, what 
they have "learned." As we have seen from our discussion in 
the above chapters, memorizing other people's ideas or 
accepting what is in a textbook as the Truth is counter-
productive to any sort of knowledge acquisition. 
Changes in the Classroom 
What we need to do in composition instruction is move 
from skill-bound, static rhetoric to a discourse which 
reunites rhetoric with thinking, asking, and interaction-- a 
marriage between rhetoric and dialectic, form and human 
activity. The teaching of rhetoric and dialectic is "a call 
-----------
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to mutual activity that obliterates the familiar passiveness 
of the classroom" (Welch 110). So, how can we do this? 
Dialectical Rhetoric and Structure 
First of all, I don't think we can totally eliminate the 
teaching of techniques and skills in composition classrooms. 
However, our teaching of these things can change. In the 
majority of composition classes, grammar, spelling, and other 
prescriptive elements of writing are taught directly from a 
textbook through quizzes, lectures, workbooks, etc.--passive 
instruction. By teaching in this way, the students memorize 
but they don't understand why the rules are important or the 
impact they have in one's writing. Therefore, the rules mean 
nothing to them. One way to avoid this kind of passive 
instruction may be to discuss the prescriptive rules and their 
value, or engage our students in a dialogue about the 
function and purpose of rules and structure. Maybe the rule 
books aren't above question? 
By engaging in a discussion about the boring elements of 
grammar, punctuation, etc., students may begin to understand 
why the rules are there or what would happen without them. By 
having these kinds of discussion in the classrooms, looking at 
examples, and truly questioning rules, students and teachers 
would both gain a deeper understanding of the value of 
prescriptive elements in writing. Also, by allowing students 
to question "authorities", they gain more confidence in the 
rules and their own abilities to ask and answer questions. 
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Dialectical Rhetoric and Context 
Dialectical rhetoric also offers better insight into 
audience analysis. If we require our composition students to 
engage in a discussion with their readers, instead of simply 
putting information out there, they are forced to engage 
themselves at a deeper level. "Dialectical rhetoric must 
partake of the mutuality that speakers and writers necessarily 
have with their audiences. The mutuality requires that the 
audience become an encoder as well" (Welch 110). 
By forcing our students to engage in a conversation with 
an audience, they will be required to look at whole human 
beings as readers of their prose. An audience will no longer 
be reduced to an unreal set of invisible readers there to be 
manipulated. 
As we discussed in chapter one, knowing how to match 
discourse with souls is an essential element of effective 
communication. And, knowing a soul is a very difficult task. 
Anyone who has ever tried to do audience analysis exercises in 
the classroom knows how difficult it is for students to 
envision anyone but themselves or the teacher as a reader of 
their document, and it is even more difficult for students to 
realize the different backgrounds behind people, texts and how 
these backgrounds affect discourse. However, maybe the 
essential problem is that composition classrooms are more 
concerned with producing writing than forcing the students to 
really get to know an audience and the expectations that 
should guide their writing. How much stress is really placed 
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on entering a dialogue with a community? The dialogue is most 
normally expected to go on between the student and the 
teacher. 
Dialectical Rhetoric and Persuasion/Morality 
The interactive requirements of dialectical rhetoric 
would help students become more aware of the affect their 
writing has on people. It is always important to make our 
students aware of the power of language and how it can be used 
to manipulate people (sophistic rhetoric). In my classroom we 
discuss the morality of advertising and try to envision who 
would be affected by what kinds of ads. We try to understand 
the motivation of ad agencies when they use manipulative 
writing to influence people. 
Dialectical rhetoric, by requiring the students to engage 
and in a sense know their audiences, places a greater degree 
of responsibility on them to be moral in their persuasive 
essays. It is easier to manipulate people you don't know. By 
placing a moral responsibility on our students and making them 
aware of the affect their writing has on people, they gain a 
greater insight into the power of language and the need to use 
it in an ethical manner. 
Dialectical Rhetoric and Knowledge 
As I have said in the beginning of this chapter, students 
have a difficult time questioning. Instead, they rely on 
someone to give them knowledge. Dialectical rhetoric forces 
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them to not only question but answer and be responsible for 
what they say. We need to help our students view dialectical 
rhetoric as a faculty to help them use both technique and 
knowledge in their writing. In this manner, dialectical 
rhetoric becomes the tertium guid in the classroom. The 
essential bridge to cross from technique to knowing. 
The most valuable gift we can give to our students is the 
ability to ask questions. For asking questions gives students 
the power to look at things in many different ways, to weigh 
the interpretations, to discover what they know. Dialectical 
Rhetoric allows them a method and a medium in which to ask and 
discover. 
Regardless of all the criticisms leveled at Plato, he is 
still an extremely valuable force in our classrooms. He has 
given us a method of inquiry that is empowering and effective. 
He has, through the Phaedrus, shown us both the beauty and the 
danger of language and has provided us with the tool to 
understand and come to know. 
92 
REFERENCES 
Aristotle. Poetics. trans. H.S. Butcher. New York: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1926. 
Bizzell, Patricia and Bruce Herzberg. The Bedford 
Bibliography for Teachers of Writing. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1991. 
Black, Edwin. "Plato's View of Rhetoric," The Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 47 (1958): 361-374. 
Brownstein, Oscar. "Plato's Phaedrus: Dialectic as the 
Genuine Art of Speaking," The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 51 (1965): 392-398. 
Bruffee, Kenneth. "Collaborative Learning and the 
'Conversation of Mankind,'" College English 46 (1984): 
635-652. 
Conley, Thomas. "Phaedrus 259e ff," Rhetoric society 
Quarterly 11 (1981): 10-14. 
Connors, Robert J. "Greek Rhetoric and the Transition from 
Orality," Philosophy and Rhetoric 19 (1986): 38-57. 
Corbett, Edward. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern student. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1965: 536-544. 
Curran, Jane. "The Rhetorical Technique of Plato's Phaedrus," 
Philosophy and Rhetoric 19 (1986): 66-71. 
DeVries, G.J. A Commentary of the Phaedrus of Plato. 




Listening to the Cicadas: A study of Plato's 
cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987: 
Golden, James L. "Plato Revisted: A Theory of Discourse for 
All Seasons," Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern 
Discourse. Eds. Robert Connors, Lisa Ede, and Andrea 
Lunsford. carbonville: Southern Illinois university 
Press, 1984: 16-37. 
Grassi, Ernesto. Rhetoric as Philosophy. University Park: 
Pennsylvania State Press, 1980: 18-34. 
Havelock, Eric. A Preface to Plato. cambridge: Harvard 
university Press, 1963. 
93 
Hikins, James W. "Plato's Rhetorical Theory," Central States 
Speech Journal 32 (1981): 160-176. 
Hunt, Everett Lee. "On the Sophists," studies in Rhetoric 
and Public Speaking in Honor of James A. Winans. Ed. 
A.M. Drummond. New York: Russell and Russell, 1962. 
Neel, Jasper. Plato. Derrida and Writing. Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1988: i-240. 
Norris, Christopher. Derrida. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987: 28-62. 
Plato. Phaedrus. trans. 
Dialogues of Plato. 
Cairns. Princeton: 
475-526. 
Reginold Hackforth. The Collected 
Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Princeton University Press, 1961: 
-----Meno. trans. W.K.C. Guthrie. ibid: 353-385. 
-----seventh Letter. trans L.A. Post. ibid: 1574-1598. 
-----Apology. trans. Hugh Tredennick. ibid: 3-27. 
-----Sophist. trans. F.M. Cornford. ibid: 957-1018. 
Sallis, John. Being and Logos: The Way of Platonic Dialogue. 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1975: 104-175. 
sinaiko, Herman. Love. Knowledge. and Discourse in Plato: 
Dialogue and Dialectic in Phaedrus. Republic. and 
Parmenides. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965: 
1-118. 
Stewart, Donald C. "The Continuing Relevance of Plato's 
Phaedrus," Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern 
Discourse. Eds. Robert Connors, Lisa Ede, and Andrea 
Lunsford. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1984: 115-127. 
Vickers, Brian. In Defence of Rhetoric. Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1988: 83-147. 
Welch, Kathleen. The Contemporary Reception of Classical 
Rhetoric: Appropriations of Ancient Discourse. 
Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990: 93-111. 
Winterowd, W. Ross. Rhetoric: A Synthesis. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1968: 1-17. 
